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THE PROGRESSIVES: RACISM AND PUBLIC 
LAW 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
American Progressivism initiated the beginning of the end of American scientific 
racism. Its critics have been vocal, however. Progressives have been charged with 
promotion of eugenics, and thus with mainstreaming practices such as compulsory 
housing segregation, sterilization of those deemed unfit, and exclusion of 
immigrants on racial grounds. But if the Progressives were such racists, why is it 
that since the 1930s Afro-Americans and other people of color have consistently 
supported self-proclaimed progressive political candidates, and typically by very 
wide margins? 
When examining the Progressives on race, it is critical to distinguish the views that 
they inherited from those that they developed. The rise of Progressivism coincided 
with the death of scientific racism, which had been taught in American universities 
since the early nineteenth century and featured prominently in the scientific debate 
over Darwin’s theory of evolution. Eugenics, which attempted to use genetics and 
mathematics to validate many racist claims, was its last gasp. The most notable thing 
about the Progressives is that they were responsible for bringing scientific racism 
to an end. 
One of the most powerful characteristics of the progressive state was its 
attentiveness to science—a characteristic that it retains to this day. When the 
Progressive Era was forming, however, genetic racism was the scientific model of 
the day, cutting across a wide range of disciplines and reaching people of all 
political persuasions, even into the most elite of American research institutions. By 
and large, non-Progressives were just as racist as Progressives and some 
significantly more so. Further, the Progressive period lay entirely within the 
southern era of Jim Crow legislated segregation, often making it impossible to 
identify particular racial attitudes in the New South as Progressive or simply as 
inherited features of long held southern racial ideas. The all-important question for 
the historian is, which racial ideas did the Progressives inherit from their 
predecessors, and which did they develop on their own? 
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Progressives did believe in a more active state, however, and racism supported by 
an activist legislative agenda can be much uglier than racism that is passively 
tolerated. One cannot characterize most of the segregationist, exclusionary, and 
other racist legislation passed during this era as Progressive, however. Southern 
states actively regulated racial exclusion by statute, and all of the racial zoning laws 
sometimes attributed to Progressives were passed in formerly slave holding states. 
Whatever the ideological or scientific sources of these laws, they were supported by 
staunch anti-Progressives. The same thing is true of compulsory sterilization laws. 
For example, the Supreme Court Justices who voted consistently against 
Progressive labor protective and other regulatory legislation voted to uphold 
compulsory sterilization of mental defectives. While many Progressives advocated 
for more restrictive immigration laws, nothing that was passed during the 
Progressive Era matched the explicit restrictions on Chinese immigration that came 
earlier, or the racist immigration restrictions enacted during the terms of anti-
Progressive Presidents Harding and Coolidge after the Progressive Era had ended. 
Finally, the attempts to link Progressive support for minimum wage laws to racial 
exclusion fail because they misunderstand the objectives of the Progressive 
minimum wage commitment and, further, pick and choose a small number of 
idiosyncratic examples from an enormous economic literature. 
The one place where a sharp difference emerged between Progressives and their 
various opponents was in the subsequent rejection of genetic racism in favor of more 
environmentalist, nurture-based models of human nature and development. More 
environmentalist views began to take hold in the social sciences in the 1910s and 
1920s and began to change legal thinking in the 1940s. They found expression in a 
Supreme Court that was almost unanimously Democrat and self-acknowledged 
Progressive. The result was gradual emergence of a division that has endured to 
this day, with Progressives largely appearing as promoters of racial inclusion and 
diversity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American Progressivism, a political and intellectual movement that lasted 
roughly from the mid-1890s until 1920, began bringing the century-old era of 
American scientific racism to an end. However, critics of American Progressivism 
have been vocal: Progressives have been charged with promoting eugenics, and thus 
with mainstreaming practices such as school and housing segregation, compulsory 
sterilization of those deemed unfit, and excluding immigrants on racial grounds.1 
The criticism has fueled movements to remove Woodrow Wilson’s name from 
Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs,2 and opposition to naming a 
building at Iowa State University after suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt3—in both 
cases because of their racism or xenophobia.4 One question this raises is, if the 
Progressives were such racists, why is it that since the 1930s people of color have 
consistently supported self-proclaimed progressive political candidates, mostly 
Democrats, and typically by wide margins? The answer, as for most important 
movements, is that we must distinguish the set of ideas the Progressives inherited 
from those they developed internally and contributed to future generations. 
The claim that many Progressives were racists is true. Some Progressives 
also held strongly exclusionary views about immigration and supported the 
sterilization of perceived mental defectives. However, Progressives inherited these 
views, and they were not appreciably different from those held by most of their non-
Progressive predecessors and contemporaries. Progressives themselves were highly 
                                                                                                                
 1. E.g., DAVID HOROWITZ, PROGRESSIVE RACISM (2016); THOMAS C. LEONARD, 
ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA (2015); ERIC S. YELLIN, RACISM IN THE NATION’S SERVICE: GOVERNMENT WORKERS AND 
THE COLOR LINE IN WOODROW WILSON’S AMERICA (reprint 2016) (2013); Richard A. Epstein, 
Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Jurisprudence of the “Progressive 
Era,” 51 VAND. L. REV. 787 (1998); Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on the “Unfit”? From 
Plessy v. Ferguson to New Deal Labor Law, 7 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1 (2011); 
Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow? Recovering the Progressive Origins of Mass 
Incarceration, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845 (2014); Malcolm Harris, The Dark History of 
Liberal Reform, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/128144/dark-history-liberal-reform; see also DAVID W. 
SOUTHERN, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND REFORM, 1900–1917 (2005). 
 2. See Andy Newman, At Princeton, Woodrow Wilson, a Heralded Alum, is 
Recast as an Intolerant One, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/nyregion/at-princeton-addressing-a-racist-legacy-and-
seeking-to-remove-woodrow-wilsons-name.html?_r=0. 
 3. See Heather Wiese, Controversy Surrounds Building’s Name, IOWA ST. DAILY 
(May 6, 1996), http://www.iowastatedaily.com/gsb/article_51b19593-b663-50f6-a7a3-
bc4ecfd83d07.html. 
 4. The efforts are not limited to Progressives. For example, early in 2017, John 
C. Calhoun’s name was removed from a Yale University building.  Noah Remnick, Yale Will 
Drop John Calhoun’s Name from Building, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/yale-protests-john-calhoun-grace-murray-
hopper.html. Calhoun, a racist political leader from South Carolina and seventh Vice 
President of the United States, died in 1850. 
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diverse on the question of race, ranging from the explicit racism of people like John 
R. Commons5 or Edward A. Ross,6 to the more egalitarian views held by the mainly 
white founders of the NAACP in 1909,7 including Jane Addams, John Dewey, 
Oswald Garrison Villard, and also Afro-Americans W.E.B. DuBois, Booker T. 
Washington, and Ida B. Wells. The NAACP embarked on a strategy of using the 
courts to combat race discrimination and segregation.8 Its first major victory in the 
Supreme Court was Buchanan v. Warley, which struck down racially exclusive 
zoning.9 
While many scientists during the Progressive Era were scientific racists, 
not all were. Further, the approaches to science that Progressives inherited from the 
past were sharply different from those that they developed and that we associate 
today with progressive science. For example, Progressive reformer Franz Boas, the 
most prominent anthropologist of his era and developer of cultural relativism, was a 
sharp critic of scientific racism as well as eugenics.10 John B. Watson, the founder 
of behavioral psychology who wrote mainly in the 1910s and 1920s, believed that 
genes had virtually nothing to do with a person’s character or intelligence; 
everything was a response to environmental stimuli.11 Progressive sociologist 
Charles Horton Cooley, son of the famous Gilded Age constitutional scholar 
Thomas M. Cooley, complained bitterly that Afro-Americans were consistently 
subjugated to Jim Crow-style treatment, even though they were equal to whites in 
character and intelligence.12 These approaches to science—not the hereditary 
determinism of the era in which Progressives were educated—are the Progressives’ 
important contributions. 
The development of these new approaches substantially brought about the 
death of institutional scientific racism, which had been taught in American 
universities since the early nineteenth century and featured prominently in the debate 
                                                                                                                
 5. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA (1907). 
 6. See generally Edward A. Ross, The Causes of Race Superiority, 18 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 67 (1901). 
 7. See, e.g., William Steuk, Progressivism and the Negro: White Liberals and the 
Early NAACP, 38 HISTORIAN 58 (1975) (account of the role of white liberals in founding the 
NAACP); see also Susan D. Carle, Debunking the Myth of Civil Rights Liberalism: Visions 
of Racial Justice in the Thought of T. Thomas Fortune, 1880–1890, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1479, 1530–32 (2009). 
 8. See NANCY J. WEISS, THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE: 1910–1940, at 47–48 
(1974). 
 9. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917); see infra text accompanying  
notes 244–50. 
 10. See  infra text accompanying notes 296–300; see also Thomas J. Horton, The 
Anthropologist as Progressive Reformer: Franz Boas and the Scientific Battle Against 
American Racism (Georgetown Univ., M.A.L.S. Thesis no. 9232, 2007), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626339. 
 11. See  infra text accompanying notes 313–20. 
 12. See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE 
LARGER MIND 218–20 (1909). 
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over Darwin’s theory of evolution.13 Eugenics, which attempted to use genetics and 
mathematics to validate many racist claims, was its last gasp. The most notable thing 
about the Progressives is that they were responsible for bringing these views to an 
end, although that did not happen immediately. 
At the time Progressivism came onto the scene, the dominant views held 
by educated Americans were historicism; traditional political economy, with its anti-
institutionalist and historical theories of value; Darwinism; and scientific racism, 
which was taught even in ivy-league institutions. Progressives decisively rejected 
historicism in favor of more forward-looking views, including marginalism in 
economics, cultural relativism in anthropology, and behaviorism in psychology. 
These scientific views were notable for the extent to which they either ignored or 
rejected genetics and other commitments to inheritance from the past in favor of 
more environmentalist alternatives. While the Progressives did not come close to 
ending racism in government policy, they did force rejection of the most racist 
elements of nineteenth-century scientific thought. 
First, determining how genetic racism and eugenics fit into Progressivism 
requires  that we identify who the Progressives were. Numerous legislative reforms 
subsequently characterized as Progressive originated in the 1890s and 1900s, 
including the Sherman Act (1890), the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), and many 
state statutes regulating hours of labor, working conditions, and professional 
licensing.14 However, the word progressive was not commonly used to describe this 
movement until 1910 or so. Prior to that, in 1894, the eminent Progressive tax 
scholar Edwin R. A. Seligman wrote a book entitled Progressive Taxation in Theory 
and Practice.15 Seligman used the term progressive not to describe a wide-ranging 
political movement, but rather a theory of taxation based on marginalist economics, 
which was only one important principle of progressivism.16 In 1908 Herbert Croly, 
founder of The New Republic, published his highly influential The Promise of 
American Life,17 which used the word progressive to advocate government 
                                                                                                                
 13. See, e.g., SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA; OR, A 
COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE SKULLS OF VARIOUS ABORIGINAL NATIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH 
AMERICA, TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN ESSAY ON THE VARIETIES OF THE HUMAN SPECIES 
(Philadelphia, J. Dobson 1839); see GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE 
WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817–1914, at 74 
(1971) (crediting Morton with developing scientific racism); see also JOSIAH CLARK NOTT & 
GEORGE R. GLIDDON, TYPES OF MANKIND (Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1854) 
(developing scientific arguments for polygenesis, or view that different races had distinct 
origins and were of different species); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation 
Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 651–57 (tracing history of nineteenth-century scientific 
racism). 
 14. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1063 passim (2017). 
 15. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d 
ed. completely rev. and enlarged 1908). The debate over “progressivism” in tax policy 
actually antedated Seligman. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 92–100 (2015). 
 16. See SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 17–35. 
 17. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1908). 
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economic planning as part of a transition to a more corporate rather than 
individualistic conception of capitalism. The political label progressive became 
popular during the 1912 presidential election campaign, where it was claimed to 
some extent by all three presidential candidates: Theodore Roosevelt, William H. 
Taft, and Woodrow Wilson.18 
Identifying the origins of a comprehensive progressive rhetoric is 
difficult.19 The reification of the term had to await such mid-century historians as 
Richard Hofstadter, whose 1955 book The Age of Reform attempted to characterize 
Progressivism and classify its members. However, Hofstadter missed some of 
Progressivism’s most important characteristics. For example, he completely ignored 
the development of marginalism in economics, which was central to Progressive 
economic policy; although he did write a great deal about the classical, or laissez-
faire, economics against which Progressives were reacting.20 
Failure to engage Progressivism’s economics has been a shortcoming in 
the intellectual history of the Progressive Era ever since. For example, Thomas 
Leonard’s excellent book Illiberal Reformers is expressly about American 
economists during the Progressive Era. However, his entire discussion of 
marginalism is limited to two pages about the marginal productivity theory of 
wages.21 Marginalism did substitute a new theory of wages, but it did much more 
than that. It developed new theories about institutions, wealth distribution, 
government regulation, competition policy, tax policy, and risk management, as well 
as methodologies that gradually came to set economics apart from the other social 
sciences.22 The best way to understand Progressivism’s reaction to Gilded Age 
individualism is to understand its economics.23 
Those who self-identified with Progressivism were diverse. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the movement’s most important intellectual characteristics were 
the following: (1) marginalism in economics, with its increased emphasis on 
forward-looking expected value and risk management, wealth distribution, and 
market failure; (2) a strong tendency to follow prevailing science, including a 
fascination for emergent social science; (3) a concern with broader political 
participation in all levels of government as well as business; and (4) a commitment 
to institutionalism, or the view that resources should and do move through society 
by diverse mechanisms, of which the traditional market is only one. These views 
were shared by many Americans, but certainly not by all. 
 Just as any other movement, the Progressives inherited some theories and 
developed others. Among the former were well-established scientific theories about 
                                                                                                                
 18. See Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AMER. HIST. 113, 
127 n.1 (1982). 
 19. See J.M. BEACH, THE ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM: A HISTORY, ch. 1 (2012). 
 20. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 142 (1955); see also HAROLD 
U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE, 1897–1917 (1951) (similar perspective on the 
same period). 
 21. LEONARD, supra note 1, at 85–87. 
 22. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15. 
 23. Id. at 76–91; SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 17–35. 
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the human race, many of which antedated the Civil War. However, as Progressive 
social science matured, it developed its own models that were much more 
environmentalist and dismissive, not only of hereditary determinism, but even of the 
very concept of race. The result was the views that we most strongly identify today 
with the Progressive social science revolutionnamely, cultural relativism, 
behaviorism, instrumentalism, and other environmentally based theories of human 
behavior.24 
For hereditary determinists, inheritance played a nearly exclusive role in 
determining an organism’s most important characteristics. Further, one’s inheritance 
from the past could not be changed. The role of the environment was thought to be 
small or even non-existent. People of all political stripes shared these views, and 
much of the legislation characterized as representing Progressive beliefs about 
inheritance and race was not passed by Progressives at all. Indeed, much of the 
current criticism of Progressives for their racism begins by identifying anyone who 
lived during that era as Progressive.25 
Was Progressive racism different from the racism of non-progressive 
contemporaries? And more importantly, who led the emergence from the heavily 
hereditary race theories of the nineteenth century to the relatively more egalitarian 
theories of the 1910s and after? Related to this last question is another: How can we 
explain the political “flip” that occurred on questions of race, origins, and 
immigration? Increasingly since the 1940s, racial minorities have aligned 
themselves with liberal or progressive political leaders. 
This Article explores American engagement with these issues in public 
law, economics, and social science. To the extent possible, it uses Progressive with 
a capital “P” to refer specifically to the short-lived movement that was a strong force 
in American politics before the election of Warren Harding in 1920. By contrast, 
progressivism with a small “p” refers to a collection of ideologies and policy 
positions that have reappeared time and again in American politics, including the 
2016 political campaigns of Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton.26 Many of these 
later self-proclaimed progressives were Democrats, but not all. For example, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower ran on a platform emphasizing “progressive moderation.”27 Nelson 
Rockefeller’s wing of the Republican Party was referred to as “progressive 
Republicans,” and included such people as Chief Justice Earl Warren.28 The original 
                                                                                                                
 24. For a chronicle of the decline of pre-Progressive theories written by a 
contemporary, see J. B. Eggen, The Fallacy of Eugenics, 5 SOC. FORCES 104 (1926). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 26. On the recurrence of self-acknowledged progressivism in American politics, 
see Hovenkamp, supra note 14. See also PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, SLOGANS, ISSUES, AND 
PLATFORMS: THE COMPLETE ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert N. Roberts, et al. eds., 2012) (discussing 
earlier campaigns). 
 27. See Norman A. Graebner, Eisenhower’s Popular Leadership, 39 CURRENT 
HIST. 230, 232 (1960) (Eisenhower’s use of terms moderate progressivism and progressive 
moderation). 
 28. To this day progressive Republicans continue to maintain a website. See 
Progressive Republicans: A New Vision for GOP, PROGRESSIVE REPUBLICANS, 
http://progressiverepublicans.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 
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Progressive movement also cut across party lines, initially claiming Republican 
Theodore Roosevelt as the first Progressive President. Republicans William Howard 
Taft and Herbert Hoover both took the Progressive label at some point in their 
careers, although today neither is regarded as a particularly good representative of 
progressive ideology. Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, was the last president to be a 
self-acknowledged part of the original Progressive movement. 
Prior to the Progressive Era, hereditary racism was the scientific model of 
the day, cutting across a wide range of disciplines and reaching people of all political 
persuasions, even into the most elite of American research institutions.29 The people 
we identify as the original Progressives were all educated during this period. By and 
large, non-Progressives were just as racist as Progressives and some significantly 
more so. Further, the Progressive period lays entirely within the southern era of Jim 
Crow legislated segregation, often making it impossible to identify particular racial 
attitudes in the New South as Progressive, rather than simply as inherited features 
of southern racial views held from long before the Civil War. This is particularly 
true for Southerners such as Woodrow Wilson. It thus becomes critical to distinguish 
the views that the first generation of Progressives inherited from those that they 
developed themselves. 
Second, one-way Progressive public policy differed from prevailing 
alternatives was that Progressives believed in a more active State. They were more 
supportive of legislative intervention than their more laissez-faire predecessors and 
opponents. Racism supported by a legislative agenda can be much uglier and more 
aggressive than racism that is passively tolerated. However, one cannot characterize 
most of the segregationist, exclusionary, and other racist legislation passed during 
this era as Progressive. Southern states actively promoted racial exclusion by an 
assortment of practices and, later, statutes collectively known today as “Jim Crow.” 
Statutory segregation began in the schools as early as the 1860s and then quickly 
spread elsewhere.30 All of the racial zoning laws sometimes attributed to 
                                                                                                                
 29. See  infra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
 30.  See Ohio v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 210–12 (1871) (upholding 1864 
provision requiring separate but equal public schools); see also Stanley J. Folmsbee, The 
Origin of the First “Jim Crow” Law, 15 J. SOUTHERN HIS. 235 (1949) (identifying first non-
school Jim Crow statute as a Tennessee separate-but-equal provision for railroads, passed in 
1881).   Dating Jim Crow depends on whether one counts racial practice or explicit legislation, 
which came a few years later.  At the state level, the era is probably best dated as from the 
end of Reconstruction in 1875 or a little later, until Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.  
See generally STEPHEN A. BERREY, THE JIM CROW ROUTINE: EVERYDAY PERFORMANCES OF 
RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND SEGREGATION IN MISSISSIPPI (2015); LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE 
IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998); I. A. NEWBY, JIM CROW’S 
DEFENSE: ANTI-NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1900–1930 (1965); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, 
RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865–1890 (1978) (looking at practice as well as 
statutes); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). Federal 
enablement came in the 1880s.  See generally THOMAS A. UPCHURCH, LEGISLATING RACISM: 
THE BILLION DOLLAR CONGRESS AND THE BIRTH OF JIM CROW (2004); RICHARD WHITE, THE 
REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
GILDED AGE, 1865–1896 (2017). 
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Progressives were passed in formerly slaveholding states.31 Whatever the 
ideological or scientific sources of these laws, they were supported by staunch anti-
Progressives. The same thing is true of compulsory sterilization laws. For example, 
the Supreme Court Justices who voted consistently against Progressive labor 
protection and other regulatory legislation also largely voted to uphold compulsory 
sterilization of mental “defectives.”32 While many Progressives advocated for more 
restrictive immigration laws, nothing passed during the Progressive Era matched the 
explicit restrictions on Chinese immigration that came earlier, or the racist 
immigration restrictions promoted and enacted in the 1920s by anti-Progressive 
Presidents Harding and Coolidge.33 
Progressive racism cannot be defended. However, the Progressives did not 
invent racism; scientific, historical, cultural, and religious racism already existed. 
During the period before 1920, many Progressives did not do much to combat racism 
either, although some did. But that gets to the next point. 
Third, one notable characteristic of Progressivism was its leadership in 
rejecting hereditary racism in favor of more environmentalist, nurture-based models 
of human nature and development. These views began to take hold in the social 
sciences in the 1910s and 1920s and began to change legal thinking in the 1940s.34 
They found expression in a Supreme Court that was almost unanimously self-
acknowledged Progressive. The result was gradual emergence of a division that has 
endured to this day, with Progressives largely appearing as the champions of racial 
inclusion, diversity, and procedural due process. 
I. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND THE SCIENCE OF RACE 
Racism was deeply engrained in nineteenth-century American social and 
scientific thought.35 The genetic Darwinism ideas that dominated racial theory after 
the Civil War initially served to reify and extend these views into the newly 
fashioned social sciences. These ideas were held by people of all political ideologies, 
although not unanimously. One set of dissenters from evolutionary racism were 
Christian evangelicals who rejected the theory of evolution, but were racist for other 
reasons.36 Another set was a dwindling number of scientists who also denied 
evolution and favored alternatives such as polygenesis, which was even more racist 
than the theories embraced by the scientific mainstream.37 
                                                                                                                
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 244–48. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 129–33. 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 270–72. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 328–38. 
 35. Good scientific and cultural surveys include RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: 
RACE AND CULTURE IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (rev. ed. 2000) and THOMAS F. GOSSETT, 
RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963). For a more global history, see generally 
PAT SHIPMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF RACISM: HUMAN DIFFERENCES AND THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
SCIENCE (First Harvard Univ. paperback ed. 2002). 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 55–57. 
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Many of these attitudes did not differ noticeably from the views of elite 
Western thinkers who wrote long before the Progressive Era. Charles Darwin 
himself believed that Caucasians had come out the winners in the human struggle 
for existence that he had described in The Descent of Man.38 In fact, many 
interpreted the theory of evolution to give credence to a secular, “scientific” view of 
racial superiority that lasted well into the twentieth century.39 
The beginning of the Progressive Era coincided with a broad-based 
revolution in the social science of race. One characteristic of progressive policy ever 
since its inception was its tendency to follow prevailing science, changing its 
political views when dominant scientific views changed. This fact has served to 
make the progressive state somewhat less stable than more ideologically driven 
alternatives, but it has also enabled the progressive state to step away from 
unappealing past commitments.40 The hereditary determinism that prevailed before 
and during the early Progressive Era tended to find strong hereditary explanations 
for criminal and other antisocial behavior, including sexual promiscuity and even 
differences in basic intelligence.41 Some writers describe these racial theories as 
progressive simply because someone asserted them during the Progressive Era. 
Some take this to uninformed extremes—even characterizing strong anti-
Progressives such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.42 or Justice James McReynolds,43 
one of the Four Horsemen who voted to strike down so much Progressive legislation, 
as progressive simply because they lived during that Era. 
As is true of so many legal movements that incorporate science, however, 
the legal policy often lagged behind the scientific understanding. One prominent 
example of this was the absorption of classical economic ideas into American 
statecraft. Americans first began to embrace laissez-faire economic ideas with the 
election of President Andrew Jackson in 1828, roughly a half-century after Adam 
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Smith articulated them in The Wealth of Nations.44 Laissez-faire economics became 
constitutional first through legislation and then through the state courts in the 
1880s;45 but not until the turn of the century in the federal courts.46 By that time, the 
marginalist revolution in mainstream Anglo-American economics was well 
underway, with its rejection of the wage-fund doctrine, as well as increased concern 
about market failure and the need for regulatory intervention.47 Holmes was already 
well aware of this in his 1905 Lochner dissent, complaining that the majority was 
deciding the case based “upon an economic theory which a large part of the country 
does not entertain.”48 In sum, American constitutional statecraft embraced laissez-
faire economic theory just as it was becoming obsolete within mainstream 
economics. Very largely the same thing happened in the case of genetic determinism 
and eugenics.49 
A. Racial Science Before Genetics 
Long before Darwin, racism was a central feature of European and 
American theories about humanity.50 It was hardly invented during the Progressive 
Era and came from a variety of sources, including both science and religion. Around 
1733, Voltaire opined in an essay that black Africans were so inferior to white 
people that they were “not capable of any great application or association of                
ideas . . . . They are a race peculiar to that part of Africa, the same as elephants and 
monkeys.”51 Twenty years later, David Hume argued that “there never was a 
civilized nation of any other complexion than white . . . . No ingenious manufactures 
among them, no arts, no sciences.”52 In his 1781 book Notes on the State of Virginia, 
Thomas Jefferson compared Afro-Americans to primates, most notably the 
orangutan.53 
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The post-Civil War era gave birth to a revolution in evolutionary social 
science theory that became institutionalized in American universities.54 Following 
Darwin himself, many of the early social scientists were scientific racists as well. 
Some were racist in more old-fashioned ways based on historical practice, their 
reading of Christian scripture, or the use of racial science and pseudoscience in the 
South to first justify slavery and later statutorily enforced segregation.55 
Darwin’s theory of evolution invited theorizing about human “stages” of 
evolution and served to rationalize white supremacy. Darwin himself predicted a 
future “at no very distant date, when an endless number of the lower races will have 
been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world.”56 Thomas 
Huxley, Darwin’s indefatigable defender and popularizer, wrote in the 1860s: 
No rational man, cognizant of the facts, believes that the average 
negro is the equal, still less the superior, of the white man. And if this 
be true, it is simply incredible that, when all his disabilities are 
removed, and our prognathous relative has a fair field and no favour, 
as well as no oppressor, he will be able to compete successfully with 
his bigger-brained and smaller-jawed rival, in a contest which is to be 
carried out by thoughts and not by bites.57 
For many, Darwinian evolution supported a linear, “scientific” view of 
racial superiority that lasted well into the twentieth century, including the period 
encompassed by the Progressive Era.58 However, during this period elite anti-
evolutionists were equally racist. For example, the prominent Harvard University 
anti-evolutionary paleontologist Louis Agassiz was a believer in polygenesis, or the 
theory that the different races had distinct origins and were not even of the same 
species. Around 1850, Agassiz gave a lecture tour with a set of photographs of 
American slaves designed to illustrate their structural inferiority.59 Belief in 
polygenesis was not uncommon among scientifically trained Americans before the 
Civil War and died out only slowly thereafter. In fact, polygenesis offered one of 
the strongest rationales for maintaining slavery and opposing interracial marriage: 
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the idea that the Afro-American was a distinct and inferior class of beings.60 Agassiz 
himself became one of the principal scientific opponents of Darwin in the United 
States, but his views were at least as racist as those of the Darwinians.61 One 
historian identifies his influence at Harvard in the 1850s and 1860s with the origins 
of American scientific racism.62 
The leading evolutionary anthropologists before the Progressive Era were 
Oxford University Professor Edward Tylor63 and Lewis Henry Morgan in the United 
States.64 Both patterned their work after Darwin, who had published On the Origin 
of Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man in 1871.65 Both Tylor and Morgan 
presented the human race as evolving through a series of stages, culminating in 
white caucasians. For Morgan, the theory of evolution showed that the black man 
was inferior to the white, and second only to Australian aborigines on a scale of 
racial inferiority.66 Morgan granted to “Aryan and Semitic nations” the status of 
superior, “because they have carried [human progress] to the highest point yet 
attained.”67 Both of their books were published in the 1870s, more than a generation 
before the rise of Progressivism. 
B. Genetics, Mathematics, and Eugenics 
Darwin, Tylor, and Morgan all wrote before genetics emerged as a distinct 
scientific field. Nevertheless, Darwin’s work inspired a great deal of scientific study 
about the link between race and inheritance. In 1877, Richard L. Dugdale, a member 
of the New York Prison Association, found inheritance and criminality to be linked 
in his book The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity.68 
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Dugdale identified more than 700 people in the extended Jukes family that had been 
criminals, suffered from mental disease, or required public assistance for their 
support.69 While Dugdale himself believed in the importance of environmental as 
well as hereditarian sources and even acknowledged that the Jukes “family” was a 
composite, his book became a hereditarian manifesto.70 
Economists and mathematicians were drawn to eugenics and genetic 
theories of race superiority much more than social scientists were.71 That fact may 
seem counterintuitive because disciplines such as anthropology and sociology 
engaged questions about race much more directly. However, the fact remains that 
eugenics was most heavily promoted in the United States by people who worked in 
mathematics, statistics, and economics, while leaders in anthropology and other 
social sciences led the reaction against eugenics that paved the way for the more 
environmentalist, nurture-based social science of the 1910s and after.72 Indeed, the 
fact that eugenics was dominated by mathematicians explained both its extreme 
positions and its eventual downfall. Eugenicists were very interested in the 
mathematics of inheritance, but they devoted little attention to the more empirical 
problem of determining which of an individual’s characteristics are inherited and 
which are a product of environmental influences. 
The rise of mathematical genetic science appeared not only to confirm the 
importance of heredity, but also to emphasize that environment and culture had little 
to do with intelligence, character, or ability. In his experiments with successive 
generations of peas, the Moravian cleric Gregor Mendel had already discovered 
what were widely perceived to be mathematical laws of inheritance. Mendel 
performed most of his experiments between 1856 and 1863, before Darwin’s work 
was well known. However, Mendel’s studies laid dormant for four decades, until 
they were uncovered at the turn of the century.73 
Around 1889, English statistician Francis Galton, first cousin to Charles 
Darwin, tried to determine precise mathematical expressions that would predict a 
child’s characteristics based on information about the characteristics of his or her 
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parents.74 Galton concluded that inherited characteristics were extremely stable and 
predicted mental ability, physical features, and behavioral features.75 For example, 
Galton’s mathematical “law of natural inheritance” prescribed that the “offspring of 
any parentage, when considered in its entirety, inherits one half of its characteristics 
from its parents, one-fourth from its grandparents, one-eighth from its great-
grandparents and so on.”76 Galton’s law of “regression from mediocrity” was that 
offspring’s inherited characteristics tended to moderate the more extreme 
characteristics of their ancestors. For example, Mendel’s studies of peas showed that 
the optimal size of seed for reproduction was 3.94 millimeters, which produced the 
highest survival rate. As peas went through successive generations, the range of 
diameters grew smaller and moved toward this optimal size.77 In 1897, Galton 
presented a mathematical paper to the British Royal Society on the inheritance of 
coat color among Basset Hounds.78 He derived a formula for making precise 
predictions about a Basset pup’s various color combinations based on data about the 
coats of its ancestors. Galton’s work in this area together with that of his mentor, the 
statistician Karl Pearson, was instrumental in developing modern regression 
analysis.79 Pearson would later write that: 
[i]t was Galton who first freed me from the prejudice that sound 
mathematics could only be applied to natural phenomena under the 
category of causation. Here for the first time was a possibility, I will 
not say a certainty, or reaching knowledgeas valid as physical 
knowledge was then thought to be—in the field of living forms and 
above all in the field of human conduct.80 
The Eugenics and Progressive movements were contemporary, and many 
of those who supported eugenics believed that legislation could be used to prevent 
or limit biological deterioration. The perceived threats were the fertility of mental 
defectives and interracial sexual relations. Nevertheless, many other Progressives 
rejected eugenics, and many followers of eugenics were not Progressives.81 Even 
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anti-Progressives who opposed many other forms of control legislation, including 
protective labor legislation, nevertheless approved highly invasive legislation that 
mandated sterilization of people thought to be mentally unfit. 
Building on the mathematical models of inheritance developed by Mendel 
and Galton, eugenics reflected extreme emphasis on the genetic content of human 
character, to the point of disregarding environmental influences altogether. 
However, at the time, eugenics was not pseudoscience. A pseudoscience, such as 
astrology, must be rejected by the contemporary scientific mainstream. But that was 
hardly the case with eugenics, which took hold in elite American institutions and 
was taught in nearly 400 colleges and universities.82 Among its supporters were 
University of Chicago and later Harvard zoologist Charles Davenport, Stanford 
University president David Starr Jordan, University of Chicago Professor John 
Merle Coulter, Yale economist Irving Fisher, University of Michigan president 
Clarence Cook Little, businessmen John D. Rockefeller83 and Andrew Carnegie, 
inventors Alexander Graham Bell and Nikola Tesla, aviator and public figure 
Charles Lindberg, as well as others too numerous to mention. 
Eugenics derived its scientific status from its impressive use of 
mathematics.84 The same was true of Progressive Era economics, where 
marginalism invited mathematics into the discipline and greatly increased its 
attractiveness to younger scholars.85 Other fieldssuch as anthropology, which was 
not mathematical and much more involved with empirical questions about 
inheritancewere more reticent. Economists lost their infatuation with eugenics in 
the late 1910s and after, as marginalism became more technical and focused strictly 
on preferences, rejected the idea that the biological quality of preferences is a 
legitimate subject of economics. In the process, economics largely cut its ties with 
the theory of evolution, including eugenics.86 
During the Progressive Era, many students of inheritance believed that 
Mendel and Galton provided the basis for a quantifiable theory. Mainstream 
scientific journals from England and America were filled with such studies.87 Most 
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of it was purely theoretical or investigative, and did not draw explicit implications 
for public policy. There were some exceptions. For example, University of Chicago 
economist James Alfred Field wrote in 1911 that “[u]nless many signs fail, the study 
of eugenics has established its claim to recognition among the hopeful applications 
of science in social reform.”88 In 1912, Popular Science Monthly included a report 
in its regular feature on “The Progress of Science” on the First International 
Eugenics Congress, which took place in London in July of that year.89 The article 
concluded that such congresses were “another witness of the growth of that best type 
of internationalism that leads scientific men to step unhesitatingly across political 
imaginary lines whenever they feel that they can work more effectively together 
than apart.”  
Darwin’s own son, Leonard Darwin, became an enthusiastic advocate of 
eugenic human engineering. In 1912, he lectured to the Cambridge University 
Eugenics Society that the “primary object of Eugenics is, no doubt, to substitute for 
the slow and cruel methods of nature some more rational, humane, and rapid system 
of selection by which to ensure the continued progress of the race.”90 Although he 
did not cite his father’s book, Variation of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication,91 he likely had it in mind. Charles Darwin himself had concluded 
that evolution proceeds much more quickly under domestication and selective 
breeding, and that evolution can be directed through artificial, as opposed to natural, 
selection. 
Most of the historical writing about the eugenics movement, and 
particularly the legal history, has focused on the implications for human inheritance 
and the unappealing policy consequences. That picture mischaracterizes the 
movement as a whole, although it was the focus of some very popular texts, such as 
Popenoe and Johnson’s Applied Eugenics.92 Eugenics actually cut much more 
broadly, dominating theories about plant and livestock breeding as well. For 
example, William Castle, a geneticist who did much of his research on fruit flies, 
wrote an important textbook on the use of eugenics in animal and plant breeding.93 
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Harvard Professor Edward Murray East’s influential 1919 book, Inbreeding and 
Outbreeding, was concerned with the science of eugenics as applied to all plant and 
animal species.94 His co-author, Donald F. Jones, was a geneticist at the Connecticut 
Agricultural Experiment Station and a pioneer inventor of hybrid corn seed.95 
However, East and Jones were scientists, not policymakers. One disturbing feature 
of their book is the ease—or even indifference—with which the authors moved from 
discussions of selective breeding in plants or horses to engineering of human beings. 
This point about the breadth of eugenics is also important when particular 
Progressive Era individuals are considered. Some Progressives did believe in 
theories about human racial selection and sterilization, but others followed eugenics 
for no other reasons than that they either had an interest in breeding plants or 
livestock, or else in its underlying mathematics. Approximately one-third of the 
articles in the early issues of Biometrika, Galton’s mathematical eugenics journal, 
were concerned with human beings and inheritance. Most of the others were about 
mice, fruit flies, plants, or other organisms.96 Further, most articles that were about 
human beings were not about racial superiority, but about such technical matters as 
the relationship between inheritance and skull shape, or the correlation between 
human hair color and eye color.97 
Two elements of eugenics’ mathematical approach to the laws of 
inheritance are critical for understanding early twentieth-century scientific racism, 
as well as the commonly accepted views about mental deficiency. These two 
elements also help explain why eugenics failed. First, Galton’s mathematical models 
functioned only if an individual’s character was solely a product of their genes. That 
is, admitting any environmental influences at all undermined mathematical 
predictability. This fact explains why the first generation of Galton’s followers were 
so steadfastly genetic in their ideas about race and capacity, completely ruling out 
or ignoring environmental influences. It also made alternative models that mixed 
environmental and genetic influences, such as those of Franz Boas and his followers, 
much more complex and unwieldy.98 However, the other important result was that 
when social science began to appreciate environmental factors more, the 
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http://www.ct.gov/caes/lib/caes/documents/publications/bulletins/b763.pdf. 
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Man, 3 BIOMETRIKA 459 (1904). 
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 280–95. 
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eugenicists’ confidence in their ability to reengineer the human race began to look 
very naive. 
Second, the mathematical models that Galton and his followers developed 
explains why genetic determinism was so popular in the scientific community. Any 
science able to embrace mathematics was thought to be superior to less quantifiable 
alternatives. That same fact accounted for economists’ claims of methodological 
superiority. However, beginning in the 1920s, economics retained its mathematics 
but largely began to assume that every individual’s utility preferences must be taken 
at face value. Searching for the sources of these preferences—biological or 
otherwise—lay outside the boundaries of scientific economics.99 In the process, 
economists largely lost their infatuation with eugenics. 
In 1901, Galton and his associates founded Biometrika, a journal 
historically dedicated to the mathematical determination of inheritance in all forms 
of biological organisms.100 American geneticists such as Edward M. East,101 
zoologist Charles Davenport,102 and William Ernest Castle,103 all members of 
Harvard’s scientific faculty, adopted these views wholesale. Among the 
recommendations eugenicists made were prohibitions of interracial sex and 
marriage. Reasoning that many relationships are formed when people are students, 
they also counseled against integrated education. The general thrust of this literature 
was not only that genetics accounts for all of the important features of human 
development, but also that environment counts for almost nothing.104 
The ideas were quickly popularized and found their way into legal 
argument. For example, in 1905, William Benjamin Smith, a German immigrant 
professor of mathematics at Tulane University, published a best-seller entitled The 
Color Line which applied eugenics to the problem of race.105 Smith argued that 
eugenics completely undermined any notion of equality between the white and black 
races, and that “it was idle to talk of education and civilization . . . as corrective or 
compensative agencies.”106 The science of genetics had shown that these institutions 
are “weak and beggarly as over against the almightiness of heredity; the 
omnipotence of the transmitted germ plasma.”107 
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Smith’s book is a classic in eugenics and race theory and has been kept in 
print.108 More significantly for legal history, the passage above from The Color Line 
was quoted verbatim in Kentucky’s brief successfully defending the segregation 
statute challenged in the Berea College case.109 The brief is interesting because 
Kentucky Attorney General James Breathitt submitted it only five months after 
Louis Brandeis had submitted his famous brief in Muller v. Oregon.110 Breathitt also 
cited Sanford B. Hunt, a Civil War surgeon who had conducted numerous autopsies 
on deceased soldiers and concluded that the brains of black soldiers were, on 
average, five ounces lighter than those of white soldiers. Hunt accepted the view—
already under sharp attack by 1908—that brain weight was proportional to 
intelligence.111 As the Attorney General’s brief emphasized: 
If we are right in our contention that intimate association in the school 
room will ultimately lead to social equality and amalgamation, who, 
then will estimate the import of this “mental gap” between the white 
and the black.112 
It is easy to discount these views as pseudoscience, and some have.113 But the fact 
is they were widely held before the 1920s by people of every political stripe, and 
even by academics at elite universities. 
By the time of Berea College, the lawfulness of racial segregation in public 
elementary schools was well established. A provision in the proposed 1875 Civil 
Rights Act had forbidden the exclusion of black students from schools, but it was 
removed prior to passage.114 Even that proposal would merely have prohibited 
exclusion, or complete denial of educational facilities to black students. It would not 
have mandated integration. The 1875 Civil Rights Act, but without the provision for 
schools, remained in force until the Supreme Court struck it down in 1883 for 
exceeding congressional power to legislate under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.115 Judicial decisions in 1871116 and 1882117 upheld segregated schools 
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in Ohio and Kentucky, provided the schools were equal.118 A number of courts also 
agreed that nothing in state or federal constitutions prohibited segregated schools or, 
in some cases, the provision of no schools at all for black children.119 All of this long 
antedated the Progressive Era. 
C. Who Supported Eugenics? 
During the Progressive Era, racism appeared often in the writings of 
liberals such as President Woodrow Wilson, economists Richard T. Ely and Irving 
Fisher, and sociologist Edward A. Ross. However, these views were just as 
staunchly held by anti-Progressives including Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
and James McReynolds, one of the Four Horsemen who voted frequently to strike 
down protective labor legislation and other forms of regulation. Wilson’s successor, 
President Warren Harding, is believed to have been inducted into the Ku Klux Klan 
in a private Green Room ceremony in the White House while he was President.120 
He and his successor, Calvin Coolidge, also campaigned for race-based immigration 
restrictions,121 which were eventually enacted in 1924 after Harding’s death.122 The 
statute, popularly known as the JohnsonReed Act, placed particularly severe 
restrictions on immigration from Africa and completely banned immigration of 
Arabs and Asians. Its stated purpose was “to preserve the ideal of American 
homogeneity.”123 Coolidge himself wrote diatribes in popular journals favoring 
racial exclusion.124 
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During its heyday, eugenics had as much traction among conservatives as 
progressive liberals.125 In the main, conservatives believed that some people were 
simply destined to be a social burden and that forced sterilization or sexual isolation 
was a way of reducing this cost. Their support for eugenics legislation seems 
inconsistent with their general embrace of laissez-faire policy. Conservatives were 
far more suspicious of legislation than Progressives were, particularly of legislation 
that limited due process rights. In light of that, the breadth of conservative support 
for statutes that sterilized people who had never been convicted of a crime126 or that 
segregated entire classes of people is remarkable. 
The historical writing on eugenics sees the movement as evolving from 
mainline to reform. Mainline eugenicists believed that heredity accounted for all 
elements of character, while later reform eugenicists acknowledged the importance 
of environmental sources.127 This development tracks changes in other social 
sciences, particularly anthropology and psychology, which rejected hereditary 
determinism early on.128 Mainline eugenicists were fairly orthodox followers of 
Galton, who advocated social policies concerning procreation based exclusively on 
genetic determinism. These policies included sterilization of those believed to be 
mentally unfit, opposition to interracial marriage, and opposition to birth control for 
fear that it would be most practiced by racially superior families, tilting population 
growth in favor of inferior races.129 Many eugenicists were also opposed to higher 
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education for women, largely for fear that it would induce upper-class women to 
have fewer children.130 
The multi-ideological nature of Americans’ support for eugenics made it 
fundamentally different from Progressive legislative reform in areas of employment 
and industry regulation. A case in point is the 1927 Supreme Court decision in Buck 
v. Bell.131 The Court ruled 81 to uphold a Virginia statute requiring Carrie Buck to 
be sterilized once it was determined that she was “feeble minded,” and that both her 
mother and her illegitimate child were feeble minded. The attack was substantive 
and not procedural132 and was based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses.133 
Justice Holmes’s opinion produced one of the most reviled statements in 
the Supreme Court lexicon: “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”134 
Nevertheless, of the nine votes cast in the decision, Justice Holmes’s is probably the 
least surprising. He was not sympathetic with most legislative reform, but he was 
also a strict textualist who frequently objected when the Supreme Court overturned 
legislation without an explicit warrant in the Constitution.135 Applying the same 
reasoning, he found no infirmity in the sterilization law. Nevertheless, his opinion 
went further, making clear that he supported the statutorily mandated sterilization of 
people whose offspring were thought to be a burden on society. He compared Carrie 
Buck’s sacrifice with that of soldiers who had fallen in combat: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon 
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call 
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to 
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the 
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, 
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or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.136 
Among the votes cast in Buck, the more interesting were those of the anti-
Progressive Four Horsemen—Justices Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, George 
Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter. These four Justices were so named because 
they so often voted to strike down Progressive regulatory legislation, including 
minimum wage laws and many business regulations.137 Only four years earlier, 
Justice McReynolds had authored the Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, which struck down a World War I era state statute aimed largely at 
Germans that severely restricted the teaching of foreign languages in elementary 
schools. He wrote eloquently about the need to extend substantive due process 
liberties beyond the economic and regulatory sphere, and provided this litany of the 
types of freedoms that should be protected: 
[N]ot merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized 
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.138 
In Buck, however, three of the four Horsemen, including Justice 
McReynolds, voted to approve the sterilization order. The fourth, Justice Pierce 
Butler, dissented, but that was very likely because he was a Catholic. Catholics on 
principle objected to surgical sterilization for largely the same reasons that they 
subsequently opposed abortion; namely, that it was intended to interfere with natural 
procreation.139 Progressive Louis Brandeis also voted in favor, as did Chief Justice 
Taft, who by this time had become quite conservative. In sum, no case can be made 
that Buck v. Bell reflects a Progressive/anti-Progressive divide among the Supreme 
Court Justices. 
Eugenics dominated mainstream scientific discourse during the period 
19001920 or so. By the early 1920s, however, it was being pushed aside by 
scientific views emphasizing nurture and environmental rather than hereditary 
determinants of human nature, in particular cultural relativism and behaviorism.140 
Increasingly, scholarly papers began to emphasize environmental factors in 
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development. The work began with study of plants and agricultural products such 
as corn, but soon expanded to animal and then human inheritance.141 Further, 
because humans create culture, environmental factors appeared to have much greater 
impact on human character than for plants and animals.142 
By 1927, the year of Buck v. Bell, compulsory sterilization legislation was 
already the target of considerable scientific doubt. Even prior to Buck, University of 
Michigan law professor Burke Shartel complained that the “proof that some form of 
social inferiority will be passed on to offspring by these persons is far from 
conclusive.”143 Assuming Carrie Buck’s feeblemindedness existed at all,144 how 
much was a product of genetics and how much emanated from the environment in 
which she, her mother, and her child were raised? The emerging view among 
contemporary scientists was that answering this question was much more difficult 
than the Buck decision suggested. 
Ironically, part of Buck’s downfall was the unintended consequences of 
state eugenics legislation that attempted to comply with due process by requiring 
evidence of the very thing that the eugenics movement assumed without proofthat 
the defects in question were actually hereditary. For example, two years after Buck, 
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the due process standards in Utah’s 
compulsory sterilization law had not been met. The statute permitted compulsory 
sterilization upon proof that “the inmate, by the law of heredity, is the probable 
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring.” After examining the record, the 
court concluded: 
As a general rule, members of judicial tribunals are not well informed 
as to the law of heredity. Even though they may be so informed, they 
may not take judicial notice that, if Esau Walton should have 
offspring, the same will be socially inadequate offspring likewise 
afflicted. Those who have made a thorough scientific study of the law 
of heredity are not in entire accord as to the operation of the so-called 
law, but doubtless persons so trained may lend valuable aid to judicial 
tribunals in determining the probable nature of the offspring of a 
given person. We doubt, however, that even the most ardent advocate 
of the immutability of the law of heredity would wish to determine 
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the probable nature of the offspring of Esau Walton without more 
facts than appear in the record before us. Be that as it may, the record 
before us does not support the finding that “by the law of heredity 
Esau Walton is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate 
offspring likewise afflicted.”145 
In 1933, Professor Jacob Henry Landman agreed with the North Carolina 
Supreme Court in his analysis of Brewer v. Valk. The court had struck down the 
state’s compulsory sterilization statute on procedural grounds because it provided 
for neither notice nor a hearing. Further, the court observed, the causes of “low 
mentality” can be numerous including “the sins of the fathers, heredity, disease, 
poverty, undernourishmentthe struggle for daily bread, dissipation, and many 
other things . . . .”146 Mary Brewer was one of 12 children, 1 of whom had died of 
meningitis. She worked in a textile plant from the age of ten, and later in a cigarette 
factory. She married an unsupportive man who drank, gambled, and was generally 
unstable. The family was forced to rely on state assistance. Landman concluded 
there was “absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Mary Brewer has a 
bad inheritance. It might well be concluded from the testimony that society is at 
fault.”147 By the late 1920s, Progressives had largely moved that view into the 
mainstream.148 In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state statute that 
mandated sterilization of criminals thrice convicted of crimes involving moral 
turpitude.149 Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court cited numerous scientific 
sources and repeatedly observed the lack of any evidence of the “inheritability of 
criminal traits,” such as those that the defendant exhibited.150 
II. RACISM AND PROGRESSIVE ECONOMICS 
A. Racism in the Classical Economic Tradition 
At least as far back as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, racism was a part 
of Anglo-American economics. A long line of economists argued that more 
advanced people are more industrious, while more primitive people are unlikely to 
accumulate significant capital or develop exchange economies. In making these 
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arguments, Smith developed a distinction between “savage” and civilized nations. 
Smith stated that savage nations 
are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, they are frequently 
reduced . . . to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and 
sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those 
afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be 
devoured by wild beasts. Among civilised and thriving nations, on 
the contrary . . . the produce of the whole labour of the society is so 
great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of 
the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may 
enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than 
it is possible for any savage to acquire.151 
Thomas Malthus spoke even more forcefully on the issue than Smith. His 
fullest discussion appears in his well-known 1798 Essay on the Principle of 
Population.152 In it, Malthus argued that population growth naturally exceeds 
growth in the food supply, thus continuously pushing people to subsistence levels. 
For Malthus, however, an inadequate food supply did not affect all peoples equally. 
At the bottom were “savages,” among whom Malthus counted North American 
Indians. For example, he observed that slavery was much more common among 
them, they were continuously at war, and often left their elderly to die.153 Next above 
the savages were shepherds, and above them farmers.154 
Even the libertarian John Stuart Mill defended British colonization of India 
in an essay otherwise advocating nonintervention in the affairs of other countries. 
For Mill, the conquest of India was a justified example of a civilized nation 
improving a barbarous one. The main limitation he required was that the occupation 
be for the purposes of improving the barbarous civilization, not for ransacking it.155 
He argued that negotiating with such nations or establishing norms by treaty would 
be useless because “barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for 
observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will 
sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.”156 
American political economists spoke similarly. For example, Brown 
University’s Francis Wayland, one of the better known nineteenth-century 
American political economists and an abolitionist, continuously contrasted “savage” 
and “civilized” societies, principally in observing that only the latter were able to 
accumulate significant capital.157 In particular, Wayland praised Great Britain for 
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attaining superiority over nearly all other nations, notwithstanding lack of “physical 
advantage.” He placed great weight on England’s free Constitution, but added that 
a constitution “is of no value, unless the moral and intellectual character of a people 
be sufficiently elevated to avail itself of the advantages which it offers.”158 Henry 
Carey, an economic advisor to Abraham Lincoln, made similar observations in his 
book Principles of Political Economy.159 
B. The Impact of Marginalism 
Between 1870 and 1930, marginalism completely upended classical 
political economy. Briefly, classical political economy had drawn its theory of value 
from the past. For example, the value of a good was thought to be a function of the 
amount of labor that had been used to make it. By contrast, for marginalists, value 
was based entirely on willingness to pay, a forward-looking concept. Further, ideas 
such as anticipated consumer demand or marginal value and marginal cost were 
capable of being quantified, making marginalism a playground for mathematics. 
Nevertheless, estimated future values are inherently less certain than those computed 
from the past.  The management of risk and uncertainty became an important feature 
of the new economics.160 This had profound implications for legal policy, 
transforming the theory of business finance161 and eventually making the 
management of foreseeable risk a central component in private law areas such as 
torts and contracts.162 
As a technical matter, marginalist economics never incorporated any 
particular theory about race or mental inferiority. By the 1930s, when its 
methodological approach had matured and found nearly universal acceptance, the 
economic mainstream generally rejected attempts to incorporate assumptions about 
mental prowess, intelligence, or any other attribute that we might associate with 
race. Rather, each person was conceived to be a rational actor who attempted to 
maximize his or her own preferences, whatever those might be. Getting behind these 
preferences to evaluate them was not the economist’s job. The only requirement was 
that preferences be rational, which meant no more than that they must be transitive. 
For example, if an individual prefers A over B and B over C, then she must prefer A 
over C. One of the things that was thought to make neoclassical economics scientific 
was this formalism of assumptions, which avoided the highly eclectic observations 
of the classical political economists that often included political theory, history, and 
even religion and ethics.163 
During its early development, however, both the usefulness and the domain 
of marginalism were controversial. Some American economists, such as John Bates 
Clark, completely embraced it. Others, such as Thorstein Veblen on the left and 
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Simon Newcomb on the right, largely rejected it.164 Many found compromises that 
permitted them to merge marginalism with some of the broader concerns about 
human nature that were characteristic of classical political economy. For example, 
the short-lived movement called Institutionalism included economists who either 
rejected or qualified marginalism in significant ways, preferring assumptions about 
human choice that drew from a wider variety of sources, including history and 
biology.165 Most of the American economists who were publishing supporters of 
eugenics were also Institutionalists. As Institutionalism lost its favor in the 1920s, 
race talk largely disappeared from mainstream neoclassical economics. 
Nevertheless, during its early days, the founders of what became modern 
marginalism included observations about race that were quite similar to those made 
by the earlier classical political economists. For example, in the 1860s William 
Stanley Jevons, one of the early British founders of marginalism, relied on Darwin 
for the view that non-Nordic people were ignorant and lacked initiative and 
foresight, making them unable to accumulate significant capital.166 In his Theory of 
Political Economy, he wrote that incentives to be productive 
depend greatly upon the character of the race. . . . A man of lower 
race, a negro for instance, enjoys possession less, and loathes labour 
more; his exertions, therefore soon stop. A poor savage would be 
content to gather the almost gratuitous fruits of nature, if they were 
sufficient to give sustenance; it is only physical want which drives 
him to exertion.167 
Even Alfred Marshall, the highly technical pioneer of marginalist industrial 
economics at Cambridge University, could not resist an occasional aside about race. 
In his Principles of Economics (1890) he described “savages” as being ruled by 
“impulse” and thus lacking the foresight for long-range planning, as opposed to 
“steadfast” Anglo-Saxons.168 The people of England, in particular, made up the 
strongest race and it was they who achieved the modern capital-labor division of the 
economy.169 
As noted above, many of America’s economic Institutionalists rejected 
neoclassical models in favor of more complex assumptions that took human biology 
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and the theory of evolution into account.170 For example, Thorstein Veblen preferred 
to speak of “instincts” rather than economic preferences, and he expressly 
incorporated Darwinian survival instincts into his theory of human choice.171 His 
writing frequently linked racial diversity to differences in preferences.172 Later 
institutionalists such as Edward A. Ross,173 Richard T. Ely,174 and John R. 
Commons175 did the same thing. 
Ross’s racial theories have been singled out as a particularly strong 
example of Progressive racism.176 However, his theories were actually a complex 
mixture of hereditary and environmental influences. In his 1901 address to the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science on “The Causes of Race 
Superiority,” he argued that adaptability to different climates accounted for a great 
deal of cultural progress and that the more favorable climates of the northern 
hemisphere were at least part of the explanation. This premise of adaptability led 
him to believe that immigration and movement are fundamentally a good thing. 
“Those branches of a race achieve the most brilliant success which have wandered 
the farthest from their ancestral home.”177 He also praised democratic forms of 
government for facilitating progress, as well as the fact that social status “depends 
little on birth and much on personal success.” In sum, while a large amount of what 
Ross said was racist, he hardly believed that genetic inheritance was the exclusive 
cause. Nevertheless, Ross believed in eugenics and supported Wisconsin’s 1913 
compulsory sterilization law.178 In fact, in one of the great academic-freedom 
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controversies of the early twentieth century, it was his views on eugenics that 
resulted in the termination of his professorship at Stanford University.179 
III. RACISM AND PROGRESSIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 
In reading the Progressive literature on race, it is important to remember 
that the period did not have our sense of political correctness about the term. For 
virtually everyone in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, race was a much 
more objective classification than it is today. That would remain true until scientific 
racism gave way to cultural relativism and behaviorism, two of Progressivism’s 
most important contributions to social science. What these Progressive 
methodologies developed was the idea that race is not an objective classification at 
all, but rather an artificial construct used for either convenience or invidious 
comparison.180 
Further, during the early twentieth century, the term race was often used in 
a non-comparative fashion, more similar to human race than as a reference to any 
particular race.181 A good illustration is Louis Brandeis’s defense of minimum wage 
legislation in an article he wrote for The Survey in 1915.182 Brandeis had represented 
workers in Stettler v. O’Hara, where the Oregon Supreme Court upheld an Oregon 
minimum wage law that applied to women and children.183 An equally divided U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the case three years later.184 By that time, Brandeis was on 
the Court but recused himself because of his prior representation. Had he 
participated, the vote would certainly have been 54 to uphold the minimum wage. 
In his article, Brandeis defended minimum wage laws for largely the same 
reasons that he defended maximum hour provisions in Muller v. Oregon.185 Mainly, 
as the bearers of children, women were particularly vulnerable if they did not receive 
a livable wage. Significantly, no part of Brandeis’s defense of minimum wage 
legislation made any reference to racial exclusion. He did speak of the necessity of 
a livable wage to prevent the “degeneration of the race,”186 but nothing in the context 
suggests that he was talking about any particular race or comparing the white race 
against others. He was talking about the damaging effects of substandard wages on 
the human race. 
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The same thing is true of Josephine Goldmark’s important 1912 
Progressive book Fatigue and Efficiency, a study of laborers who were overworked 
to produce greater productive efficiency.187 Goldmark was Brandeis’s sister-in-law 
and had co-authored the famous Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon. Goldmark 
devoted a subchapter of her book to the topic of Race Degeneration.188 However, 
once again, she clearly was not drawing any comparisons among Aryans, 
Europeans, Africans, Asians, or any other ethnic group. Her point was simply that 
overwork led to high death rates, low birth rates, promiscuity, and other bad 
outcomes. To the extent she talked about any particular race at all, it was the “factory 
population” themselves or people living in areas where factory employment was 
highest. Indeed, the vast majority of factory workers were white. Harsh working 
conditions had produced “[a] race of pale, stunted, and emaciated creatures irregular 
in their lives and dissolute in their habits.”189 She observed data that in various 
countries that had a military draft, “the proportion of young men rejected for 
physical unfitness is far higher in industrial communities than in others.”190 She cited 
similar observations about Italian working women, who exhibited a greatly impaired 
ability to bear children if they were employed in industrial occupations.191 It is thus 
important not to overread mentions of race in Progressives’ discussions of worker-
protective legislation. Some of them implied notions of Aryan superiority or the 
comparative inferiority of Africans or Asians, but many did not. 
Some historians have argued that support for minimum wage laws and 
other protective legislation was driven by essentially racist concerns. The thrust of 
this argument is that minimum wage laws would reduce the demand for labor, and 
that employers would selectively reduce hiring by favoring Aryan groups. When the 
legislation at issue concerned maximum hours or working conditions, the argument 
was that white workers needed protection from workers of other races who were 
willing to work for lower wages or under more adverse conditions. 
Most American economists who identified with the Progressive movement 
argued in favor of workers’ protective legislation, particularly maximum hour and 
minimum wage laws, and regulation of employee safety. Some of these statutes were 
addressed by the Supreme Court and struck down on grounds of liberty of contract, 
held to be protected by one of the Constitution’s due process clauses.192 The legal 
history of the conflict between Progressive economics and the Supreme Court before 
the court-packing controversy in 1937 is in large part a story of these decisions. 
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However, as noted below, only a tiny fraction of this literature, including the judicial 
decisions, ever suggested racial or ethnic exclusion was a rationale. 
State minimum wage statutes developed in the United States in two stages. 
The first group was passed between 1912 and 1923 by 17 states and the District of 
Columbia.193 A few of these were upheld, but several were struck down by both state 
and federal courts, mainly on liberty of contract grounds. Some were upheld as 
applied to minors, but not to adults, and some were upheld as applied only to women. 
Some were never enforced. In any event, the 1923 Supreme Court decision striking 
down the Washington, D.C. minimum wage statute for women was thought to kill 
the minimum wage movement in the states.194 However, new state initiatives 
emerged in the 1930s. A closely divided Supreme Court initially struck down a state 
statute just before the 1937 court-packing controversy,195 but upheld another soon 
after.196 The judicial resolution to the court packing controversy actually occurred 
in a set of disputes about state minimum wage laws, not, in the first instance, about 
federal New Deal legislation.197 
Whether or not the claims linking racism to workers’ protective legislation 
such as minimum wage laws are plausible, they must be placed in perspective. They 
were certainly not Progressive economists’ central argument supporting such 
legislation; at most, they were a sidebar raised by a very small percentage of the 
defenders of the minimum wage provisions. 
The rationales that Progressive Era economists gave in support of 
protective legislation, including minimum wage laws, are fairly well understood. 
Most were enthusiastic participants in the marginalist revolution in economics, 
which saw value in forward-looking conceptions of willingness to pay or anticipated 
contribution. The result was the death of the wage-fund doctrine, one of the more 
extreme examples of historicism in classical political economy. The backward-
looking wages fund, which was a staple of classical political economy through Mill, 
argued that the rate of wages was limited by a fund made up of capital accumulation 
from a previous time period. This iron law of wages, as it came to be called, entailed 
that the fund, divided by the number of workers, placed an absolute limit on 
individual wages. Attempts to pay more would require the firm to borrow against 
the future, producing bankruptcy and even greater distress for workers.198 
For marginalists, the proper rate of wages was seen not as a function of 
what was previously paid in, but rather of the worker’s anticipated contribution to 
the value of his employer. In the words of John Bates Clark, the most prominent 
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technical American economist of his generation, this principle led to a “scientific 
law of wages.”199 After completely dismantling the wage-fund doctrine, Clark 
explained that, in a competitive economy, the returns for every factor, or element of 
production, are driven to their marginal values. Lenders of capital, owners, 
suppliers, and laborers would all receive the value of their contribution, provided 
that the markets in question were competitive.200 A vast amount of Progressive Era 
economic literature defended and developed this proposition.201 
The competition issue posed the principal difficulty. Labor markets, 
particularly for unskilled labor, were thought to be much more competitive than 
markets for production and capital. As a result, when it came to labor, employers 
had much greater buying power than workers had selling power. The economic term 
monopsony, or buyer-side monopoly, would not enter the economic literature until 
the early 1930s, when Cambridge economist Joan Robinson introduced it in her 
book The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Speaking of wages, Robinson 
showed explicitly what many Progressives had intuited: a monopoly employer, or 
monopsonist, suppresses the buying price—in this case wages—by suppressing 
employment. As a result, correcting monopsony would result in both higher wages 
and higher employment. As Robinson observed, “[T]he rise in wages which reduces 
exploitation and transfers a part or the whole of the monopsony profit to labour will 
actually result in an increase of employment.”202 To the extent this problem was 
corrected, higher wages would produce both greater income for workers and more 
jobs. To the extent that Progressives understood this, the argument that higher wages 
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would suppress demand and exclude Afro-Americans or foreigners was fallacious. 
Eliminating monopsony would actually produce higher wages and more jobs. 
Many Progressive Era economists believed that the market in which 
capitalists purchased labor was far less competitive than the market in which 
laborers sold it, particularly if the market in question was for unskilled labor.203 They 
saw correctly that American industry was producing ever-increasing returns, most 
of which were not going to labor. For them, the question was who should be getting 
the benefits of the increase. Progressives posed the question as the following: Who 
should be the “residual claimant” of increased industrial productivity?204 
Traditionalists and some Progressives argued that the increased returns properly 
belonged to capital because machinery, a product of capital, was responsible for 
nearly all of an enterprise’s increased productivity.205 But the emergent Progressive 
argument was that laborers were getting an ever-smaller share of industrial growth 
because capital markets were much less competitive than labor markets. Well-
organized capitalists had complete control over unorganized labor markets. As a 
result, “the residual claimant is monopoly,” Wharton business college Dean Simon 
Patten concluded in 1908.206 
Overall, the writing of Progressive economists on the wage question 
developed these positions: 
1. The maximum wage is determined, not by the wage-fund doctrine, 
but rather by the worker’s marginal contribution to employer 
value.207 
2. If all markets were fully competitive, then laborers would earn 
precisely their contribution, but in fact wage-earner markets are more 
competitive than capital markets; as a result, workers are not getting 
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their fair share.208 Further, correcting this imbalance would not 
produce fewer jobs. 
3. Laborers are entitled to a living wage,209 which can be determined 
by assessing cost of living for the typical wage-earning family.210 
4. Low wages and harsh conditions were being exacerbated by 
excessive use of child labor and excessively lenient immigration 
policies 
Historians Bernstein and Leonard looked at roughly two dozen 
publications written by Progressives that linked the mandated minimum wage to 
effects on employment of immigrants, Afro-Americans, or those deemed unfit.211 
This is a tiny portion of the Progressive literature devoted to wage economics or 
minimum wage legislation.212 Further, none of the articles they rely on are 
fundamental, technical, neoclassical analyses of the kind that reflected the impact of 
the marginalist revolution in economics. Rather, they are book reviews, roundtable 
discussions, or articles that attempted to tie economics to broad political policy. 
Further, in the literature that Bernstein and Leonard cite, many of the 
statements appear to be taken out of context or are interpreted differently than their 
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authors intended.213 The strongest case for their position is Columbia University 
economist Henry Seager, who argued the eugenics line that sterilization of the unfit 
could reduce the supply of marginal workers.214 However, he also admitted that this 
concern “may seem somewhat remote from the minimum wage but such a policy 
judiciously extended should make easier the task of each on-coming 
generation . . . .”215 He then added that child-labor provisions should be used as well 
as “facilities for industrial and trade training” in the public schools.216 Bernstein and 
Leonard also quote a passage in which Seager stated that serious laborers needed 
protection from the “casual worker and the drifter,”217 but Seager himself made no 
attempt to identify this phrase with immigrants, eugenically unfit racial minorities, 
or any other particular group.  In fact, his essay never mentions immigrants or race 
at all. Further, the thrust of his article was that society needed to provide education 
and training with a view toward creating a prosperous working class of participatory 
citizens. In his economics textbook, published the same year, Seager argued that 
many immigrants may had been deceived into coming to America: 
In the cities of the United States competition for employment in the 
sweating trades is made especially severe by the steady influx of 
immigrants, many of whom find this species of work the easiest to 
take up, and do not learn, until after they have been in the country 
some time, how much worse they are than American workmen in 
other trades.218 
Bernstein and Leonard also cite a statement from A.B. Wolfe, another 
Progressive economist, speaking in a roundtable discussion, that “[i]f the inefficient 
entrepreneurs would be eliminated [by minimum wages], so would the ineffective 
workers.”219 But the statement makes clear that Wolfe was acknowledging the 
existence of inefficient employers as well as inefficient laborers, and his belief that 
a minimum wage law would weed out both, “wherever they are.” Significantly, 
Wolfe never mentioned breeding, eugenics, or race; but simply observed that some 
employers and laborers were less effective than others. His central argument was 
that capital markets are noncompetitive, that stock prices were greatly inflated, that 
stockholders demanded a return in proportion to this inflated value, and that interest 
rates were too high.220 All of these problems suggested to Wolfe that wages could 
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in fact be raised without damaging productivity, simply by squeezing some 
monopoly out of the supply side. In redistributing from producers to labor, there was 
much more surplus available on the supply side than the demand side. Wolfe then 
added, “Turning now to labor supply, the idea that standard minimum wages would 
stimulate further overgrowth of population is not well founded. One way to reduce 
the birth rate is to raise the standard of living, and the only way to do that is to raise 
wages.”221 For that, he advocated giving women greater economic independence so 
that they would “not be tempted to marry simply to escape long hours of hard work 
at low pay . . . .”222 
Notably, neither Wolfe nor his fellow roundtable discussants said anything 
about eugenics or race. Wolfe mainly observed that just as not all firms are equally 
efficient neither are all laborers, and a mandatory minimum wage would put pressure 
on both. Wolfe’s only mention of immigration was in a paragraph arguing that a 
minimum wage law is not “the only line of economic advance.” In addition, there 
should be “vocational education, restriction of immigration, birth control, 
segregation of the unemployable.”223 Even this passage cannot be construed as 
talking about anything more than numerical quotas.  He never suggested excluding 
particular people based on race or nationality. To be sure, ethnic or race-based 
restrictions on immigration did come, but these were at the behest of the anti-
Progressive administrations of Harding and Coolidge.224 
Bernstein and Leonard also discuss a book review by Royal Meeker, a 
Princeton economist who later worked in the Wilson administration. They quote him 
as saying the following: 
It is better to enact a minimum-wage law, even if it deprives these 
unfortunates of work. Better that the state should support the 
inefficient wholly and prevent the multiplication of the breed than 
subsidize incompetence and unthrift, enabling them to bring forth 
after their kind.225 
However, it is clear from the context that Meeker is reacting to the reviewed 
author’s proposal that the state pay a supplement sufficient to raise the wages of 
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substandard workers to an acceptable subsistence level.226 By contrast, Meeker 
himself advocated for worker training, speaking of the “duty of the state to provide 
manual and technical training to those born under its sovereignty, to the end that the 
inefficient may be diminished or eliminated.”227 In other words, Meeker was not 
speaking about a problem of heredity or race, but rather of lack of training that could 
be remedied if the State would provide it. Indeed, he rejected the author’s view that 
“the poor are poor through their own laziness, inability or thriftlessness.”228 This 
was not an essay about heredity at all, but rather about lack of job skills. 
 Bernstein and Leonard also briefly mentioned a 1913 article by Paul 
Underwood Kellogg, a civil libertarian who worked as a journalist and social 
reformer and was a founding member of the ACLU. Kellogg discussed the 
relationship between immigration policy and the minimum wage law.229 He saw the 
fundamental problem as an excessive labor supply and believed that limitations on 
child labor and the labor of women was a partial corrective. But he also believed 
that there should be immigration restrictions, focused on immigrants destined for 
industrial occupations.230 Under his proposal, a minimum wage would apply to 
corporate employers and would limit the minimum wage of immigrants for a period 
of five years until they could become naturalized citizens. The wage would be 
determined as “a subsistence basis for American family livelihood.”231 The proposal 
would not apply to non-corporate employers, including agriculture employers. He 
argued that with this restriction in place the wages of existing unskilled labor would 
“creep up toward the federal minimum.” Significantly, Kellogg made no mention of 
any racial or ethnic restrictions, but appeared to be speaking about immigration 
quotas generally. Further, the proposal was not aimed at exclusion of immigrants 
but rather at raising the general level of industrial wages. 
Clearly, Progressive legislation could be exclusionary, sometimes on racist 
grounds or based on assumptions about mental unfitness. But, there is little support 
for the proposition that racial exclusion was a central part of Progressives’ 
motivation in enacting minimum wage or maximum hour laws. 
Workers’ protective legislation, like all legislation, benefits some people 
and harms others. Sometimes one can generalize by dividing affected groups into 
categories, such as competitors or those who are suppliers or customers.  Sometimes 
differential effects are caused by different cost structures, technologies, or 
education. Nevertheless, it is naive to point to a policy as deficient simply because 
it has particular effects on one certain group. For example, one does not rehabilitate 
Lochner simply by showing that unionized bakers approved of the ten-hour law 
because it raised the costs of more marginal bakers.232 The ten-hour law was also 
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heavily supported by groups concerned about working conditions. Virtually every 
government action benefits some groups while harming others. Assessing welfare 
requires a mechanism for netting out these gains and losses. 
IV. RACISM AND THE ACTIVE STATE 
The Progressives believed in a more active state than their more laissez-
faire predecessors and contemporaries. Most Progressive Era regulation was 
economic, resulting from changes in population demographics and economic theory 
that led them to place less faith in private markets. Nevertheless, one possibility that 
cannot be ignored is that even if Progressives were not more racist than laissez-faire 
alternatives, Progressive policy might have been more exclusionary or 
discriminatory simply because Progressives produced more legislation. The 
common law largely tolerated most forms of private racism but rarely compelled it. 
By contrast, de jure segregation, compulsory sterilization, and racist immigration 
restrictions were all legislative products supported by the power of the State. 
However, one is hard-pressed to show that the Era’s legislation that 
discriminated based on race or that compelled sterilization or exclusion of 
immigrants was particularly attributable to Progressives. During Reconstruction and 
the Gilded Age, the most prominent privately initiated racial social practice in the 
South was not segregation at all, but absolute exclusion. That is, Afro-Americans 
were not accorded separate-but-equal facilities, but rather no facilities at all.233 At 
the end of Reconstruction, southern states and municipalities began passing a wide 
variety of Jim Crow laws providing for segregated public facilities.234 This process 
accelerated after the Supreme Court struck down the 1875 Civil Rights Act in 
1883.235 All of this happened well before the rise of Progressivism. The record in 
the Civil Rights Cases and other litigation makes clear that both exclusionary and 
segregationist practices were already widespread at that time, even among common 
carriers and inns, two entities that traditionally had universal service obligations.236 
In 1888, the state of Mississippi passed a statute mandating racially segregated 
trains, and Louisiana passed a virtually identical statute in 1890.237 Both statutes 
produced challenges that went to the Supreme Court, which upheld the first statute 
against a Commerce Clause challenge in 1890,238 and the second statute against an 
Equal Protection challenge in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.239 
Segregated public schools appeared in all parts of the country soon after 
the Civil War. In the South, statutory segregation replaced a system in which 
enslaved children were generally forbidden from going to school at all.240 This also 
occurred long before the rise of the Progressive movement, and its legacy in the 
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South persisted well beyond the Progressive Era and into the mid-twentieth century. 
Indeed, the earliest school segregation legislation dates to the 1860s, and the cases 
upholding it to the 1870s and 1880s.241 
Progressive Era decisions approving segregated colleges and residential 
zoning need to be read in this light. For example, no case can be made that 1904 
Kentucky legislation compelling segregated colleges was either a novelty or a 
Progressive initiative. Although a slave state, Kentucky chose to remain with the 
Union in the Civil War, largely because it would have been first in line for 
invasion.242 In 1874, it passed a statute providing for segregated elementary and 
secondary schools, replacing a policy of completely denying education to black 
students.243 The later statute, extending segregation to colleges, had been proposed 
by state representative Carl Day, a vehement segregationist, who was outraged when 
Progressive President Theodore Roosevelt invited Booker T. Washington to dine 
with him in the White House.244 At that time, Berea was Kentucky’s only integrated 
college. The Supreme Court upheld the Kentucky statute in 1908.245 Justices Harlan 
and William R. Day were the only dissenters. In Lochner three years earlier, both 
had also dissented from the decision striking down the maximum hours statute. By 
contrast, all of the Justices left over from the majority that struck down the statute 
in Lochner voted to uphold the segregation statute.246 
The same thing is true of the segregationist zoning statutes leading up to 
the Supreme Court’s Buchanan v. Warley decision in 1917, which struck them down 
for interfering with liberty of contract. Some supporters of segregation by zoning 
were acknowledged Progressives, while others were not. All of the statutes were 
passed in what had been slave states prior to the Civil War, although three of them 
(Kentucky,247 Maryland,248 and Missouri) were border states that chose to remain in 
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the Union. More than anything else, the legislation reflected Jim Crow racial policies 
that long antedated the Progressive Movement. Other states passing the statutes 
included Georgia,249 North Carolina,250 South Carolina, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Virginia.251 These were not the nation’s first segregationist zoning restrictions. 
Twenty years earlier, the federal courts had considered and struck down legislation 
that excluded Chinese from certain residential areas.252 
The one significant Progressive presence in the Buchanan litigation was 
the NAACP.253 From then through the 1950s, the NAACP aggressively pursued an 
agenda to abolish racial segregation. Its activities were paralleled by the National 
Urban League, another Progressive organization whose main purpose was to 
broaden economic opportunity for Afro-Americans, particularly those who had 
migrated north. Like the NAACP, the Urban League also developed a litigation 
agenda. For example, it was a major force behind the move to litigate against racially 
restrictive private covenants.254 
Exactly how much of the political force supporting the racial zoning laws 
was a species of Progressive reform, and how much was a simple application of Jim 
Crow? Long before the rise of Progressivism, every state that had passed a 
segregationist zoning law had also practiced de jure segregation of public facilities 
and operated segregated schools.255 Northern cities also experienced huge influxes 
of Afro-Americans, much of it just as the zoning statutes were being passed. Indeed, 
the great migration of Afro-Americans, which began early in the twentieth century, 
saw tens of thousands of Afro-Americans leaving southern cities for homes in the 
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North.256 Nevertheless, none of these states or their municipalities ever passed a 
racial-segregation zoning provision. 
In defending their segregationist zoning ordinance to the Supreme Court, 
the City of Louisville, Kentucky, relied heavily on racial science. The Louisville 
Brief on Reargument, which was modelled after the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. 
Oregon, contained about a half-dozen pages of legal argument and 100 pages 
summarizing scientific evidence supporting the case against racial integration.257 
Mainstream science had already rejected much of the evidence that the brief cited.258 
It included a discussion of Benjamin A. Gould’s study of autopsy reports of Civil 
War soldiers indicating that “mulatto,” or mixed race soldiers, were chronically 
unhealthy.259 A principal concern of the brief was interracial marriage, which was 
the subject of many of the cited studies.260 
Opposition to interracial marriage was neither novel nor Progressive. Many 
of the colonies had forbidden interracial marriage, beginning with a Maryland 
statute passed in 1661 that prohibited white women from marrying slaves.261 Many 
states, both slave and free, passed anti-miscegenation statutes as early as the 
1820s.262 During the regional strife preceding the Civil War, some northern states 
repealed their statutes.263 In sum, state anti-miscegenation statutes were hardly a 
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Progressive initiative, although contemporary racial science certainly served to 
strengthen long-held prejudices. 
One set of practices that did develop during the Progressive Era was 
widespread, mandatory sterilization of certain criminals and, more significantly, 
people who were deemed “defective” but had never been convicted of a crime. As 
noted previously, these statutes and procedures were a product of Gilded Age racial 
science and eugenics. However, it is equally clear that support for them was 
widespread and hardly limited to Progressives. For example, Supreme Court Justices 
who opposed most Progressive labor-protective legislation supported compulsory 
sterilization.264 
The remaining set of racially exclusionary statutes were the immigration 
acts, particularly the Act of 1924.265 The history of racial exclusion under 
immigration acts actually goes back to the early National Period. The Naturalization 
Act of 1790 permitted entry and naturalization to any “free white person.”266 The 
Naturalization Act of 1870, enacted in the wake of the Civil War Amendments, 
provided that “the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African 
nativity and to persons of African descent.”267 Other non-whites were not 
mentioned.268 The Page Act of 1875 first introduced explicit exclusion of Asians.269 
Ostensibly, the statute was directed at people from “China, Japan, or any Oriental 
country” who were coming into the United States under peonage contracts or who 
were being imported for “lewd or immoral purposes.”270 That is, the explicit purpose 
of the statute was not so much to exclude Asians per se, but rather to combat the 
practice of luring Asian immigrants into the country with passage to be paid for by 
service in the United States. The provisions paralleled those of the Anti-Peonage 
Act of 1867,271 and were intended in part to enforce the involuntary servitude 
provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. The statute also made it unlawful for 
persons to immigrate if they had a criminal record in their own country. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly barred Chinese immigration, at least if those 
immigrating were laborers.272 Under it, “the coming of Chinese laborers to the 
United States . . . [was] suspended.”273 
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One exclusionary statute passed during the Progressive Era was the 
Immigration Act of 1917, which required a literacy test for immigrants and barred 
most Asian laborers. Significantly, Progressive President Wilson vetoed the bill 
twice, but was eventually overridden by Congress.274 His veto message on the first 
bill described the Act—particularly its literacy test and quotas—as a distinct 
departure from a long American tradition of generally open immigration: 
[The bill] seeks to all but close entirely the gates of asylum which 
have always been open to those who could find nowhere else the right 
and opportunity of constitutional agitation for what they conceived to 
be the natural and inalienable rights of men; and it excludes those to 
whom the opportunities of elementary education have been denied, 
without regard to their character, their purposes, or their natural 
capacity.275 
In sharp contrast, anti-Progressive Presidents Harding and later Coolidge 
both favored stronger and explicitly race-based restrictions. The Immigration Act of 
1921, also known as the Emergency Quota Act, was passed early in Harding’s term. 
The Act employed a quota system that strongly favored Western European 
immigrants over those from Eastern and Southern Europe or non-European 
countries.276 While he was Harding’s Vice President, Coolidge had written a popular 
article in Good Housekeeping magazine entitled Whose Country is This?  Coolidge 
argued that America must be kept “American.” Biological laws, he argued, 
showed that Nordics “deteriorate” when mixed with other races.277 
President Harding did not live to see the statute he really wanted enacted. 
The Immigration Act of 1924, known as the JohnsonReed Act, was signed by his 
successor, Calvin Coolidge, six months after Harding’s death.278 That statute made 
the quotas in the 1921 Act permanent, and also limited the annual number of 
immigrants from any country to 2% of the number who were already living in the 
United States in 1890, 35 years prior to the statute’s passage. The choice of 1890 as 
a base year might seem peculiar, but its purpose was undoubtedly that the quotas not 
reflect the large numbers of Southern European immigrants that came in after 1890. 
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The quota system strongly favored immigration from Northern Europe and the UK, 
because that was where most people had immigrated from before that time. The 
statute also forbade immigration by any person who was otherwise barred from 
pursuing citizenship by virtue of race or nationality. At the time, existing law 
prohibited most Asians, including Chinese and Japanese, from obtaining citizenship. 
As a result, under the 1924 Act they were not permitted to immigrate either. 
To summarize, while Progressivism’s idea of a more active state might 
have become an aggressive tool for expressing racist ideology, the actual legislative 
record does not indicate that legislation promoting racial exclusion or sterilization 
of the unfit was uniquely or even substantially Progressive in its origins. Most of the 
sources lay elsewhere. 
V. PROGRESSIVES AND THE NATURE/NURTURE CONTROVERSY 
When thinking about the Progressives, or any other movement for that 
matter, it is important to distinguish the ideas they inherited from those they 
developed for themselves. The first generation of Progressives inherited scientific 
racism and did little to lift themselves out of it, although there were some important 
exceptions.279 Before long, however, Progressives began to develop less historicist 
and more environmentalist conceptions of human nature.280 To be sure, neither they 
nor anyone else ever came close to eradicating racism from American society. 
Nevertheless, through a gradual process, the social science of the 1910s and after 
undermined the scientific basis for genetically exclusive, natural-science driven 
views about human intelligence and capacity. These views were distinctly 
Progressive in that they were not simply borrowed from the scientific theories of the 
Gilded Age and earlier. They began to have an important impact on the public law 
of race relations in the 1940s. 
Just as marginalism in economics, environmentalist theories in the social 
sciences carried few preconceptions about the quality or origins of behavior other 
than that it be valuable to the person making the choice.281 Both economic 
marginalism and environmentalist social science reflected a strong opposition to 
historicism, or the idea that who we are is completely controlled by our pasts.282 By 
contrast, Gilded Age racial determinism was strongly historicist, built on the 
proposition that the past controls our character and destiny, and that pasts are 
unchangeable. To a significant extent, that was also true of classical political 
economy, which saw value as a function of past decisions. 
The high point of historicism in American public law was the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. In upholding the separate-but-equal 
segregation statute for passenger railroads, the Court observed that the constitutional 
argument against the statute “assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by 
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legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured . . . except by an enforced 
commingling of the two races.”283 This argument, which would be played out 
repeatedly in the segregationist writings of the South, was that racial social relations 
were the product of long-developed custom and could never be changed in the 
twinkling of an eye by legislation.284 
Likeminded historicist voices of the era, such as James Coolidge Carter, 
William Graham Sumner, and Thomas M. Cooley, were devoted to this proposition. 
Carter steadfastly opposed codification, or displacement of the common law by 
statutes. His most important book, posthumously published as Law, its Origin, 
Growth and Function, argued that historical practice as reflected in the common law 
was an inexorable result of human custom and instinct, which legislation was 
powerless to change.285 Yale political economist William Graham Sumner reflected 
that view in his more popular book, Folkways.286 Sumner’s theme, that “Folkways 
are not Stateways,” argued that legislation that attempts to change long-held values 
and beliefs will simply fail. Legal scholar and Michigan Supreme Court Justice 
Thomas M. Cooley, one of the Gilded Age architects of substantive due process, 
protested the use of legislation to induce economic change because it would be 
“casting overboard the wisdom of experience,” substituting “the winds of mere 
speculative abstractions.”287 By contrast, the common law develops out of “the 
nature of the people themselves” as an “outgrowth of their habits of thought and 
action.”288 
The historicist position reflected the principal noneconomic objection to 
the Progressive agenda favoring increased regulation and worker protection statutes: 
that nearly all of it was accomplished by legislation. Because of its instantaneous 
and broadly revisionist nature, legislation was capable of dismissing years of social 
and judicial experience with one pen stroke. To be sure, the Plessy separate-but-
equal statute was legislation, but Justice Brown’s opinion for the Court saw it as 
something far different than the legislation contemplated by Progressives. For 
Justice Brown, Jim Crow statutes were nothing more than a reflection of long-held 
southern values. They were designed to preserve the status quo, not to change it. 
As far as the nature/nurture controversy was concerned, that Progressives 
would choose nurture was methodologically inevitable. Their forward-looking 
theory of value precluded any other choice. In his book History of Economic 
Analysis, Joseph Schumpter conceded as much, but he nevertheless castigated 
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marginalism for finding arguments from nature and heredity to be unimportant.289 
As he put it, marginalist “economists, who are or should be vitally interested in the 
range of variation of individual ‘abilities’ and in the question of their inheritance, 
are but mildly interested in the specifically racialist aspect of the latter.”290 
Schumpeter himself had relatively little to say about the subject of genetics or 
eugenics, although he was sympathetic with some parts of the eugenics agenda. For 
example, in 1941 he suggested that the urge to procreate produced a bias against 
people of higher intelligence. “The men and women who want to do something in 
this life don’t want children in the next room. They will be the ones to restrict 
families first.”291 
In addition to marginalist economics, two of Progressivism’s most 
important intellectual contributions were cultural relativism and behaviorism. The 
former developed mainly within anthropology and the latter in psychology. Both 
spread to other disciplines and, at least in the case of cultural relativism, more 
broadly to ethics and religion. Using cultural relativism as a foil, conservatives 
branded progressivism in the 1930s and after as an ideology without values.292 For 
example, for Protestant liberalismthe strongest expression of cultural relativism 
in religion at the time—all beliefs and values were culturally derived and equally 
legitimate, provided that they did not harm others.293 That is, progressive 
Christianity came to embrace inclusion to the extreme.294 
A. Cultural Relativism 
The person most identified with cultural relativism in anthropology was 
German born Franz Boas, whose book The Mind of Primitive Man was published in 
1911, a dozen years after he became a professor of anthropology at Columbia 
University.295 By that time, Boas had been studying human culture for more than 20 
years, after an early career in geography and physics and 10 years as a museum 
curator at the Smithsonian. He was in his early 50s when Primitive Man was 
published.296 
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Each chapter of Boas’s book dismantled a particular aspect of scientific 
racism. His opening chapter, entitled Racial Prejudices, completely undermined the 
notion of earlier evolutionary anthropologists that evolution had been a more-or-less 
linear progression with Aryan northern Europeans at the culmination. Even a 
minimal knowledge of history revealed that the world had experienced many periods 
in which non-Aryan groups such as the Chinese had developed advanced 
civilizations and culture. In fact, “[s]everal races have developed a civilization of a 
type similar to the one from which our own had its origins.”297 He also attacked the 
view that a correlation exists between intelligence and brain weight,298 and argued 
that there was no observable correlation between race and intelligence.299 
In a second chapter, entitled Influence of Environment Upon Human Types, 
Boas argued that environmental factors dominated inheritance in determining 
human typology. He believed that one of the biggest factors in determining which 
tribes or cultures were “primitive” and which were more advanced was the degree 
of interaction with other tribes or cultures.300 Further, “retarding” influences in the 
environment inevitably affected the extent of total human development. For 
example, children who are afflicted with disease or other adverse circumstances at 
an early age might develop out of these conditions, but their total development 
would generally be less than the development of a child raised in healthier 
circumstances.301 “Illness in early childhood, malnutrition, lack of fresh air and 
physical exercise, are so many retarding causes, which bring it about that the 
growing individual of a certain age is in its physiological development younger than 
the healthy, well-nourished individual . . . .”302 
Boas could not find “any example in which the influence of [natural] 
selection has been proved beyond cavil.” However, he was “able to demonstrate the 
existence of a direct influence of environment upon the bodily form of man . . . .”303 
Apropos of this, he was able to show significant differences in body type between 
first- and second-generation immigrants to the United States and the peoples from 
which they had come.304 The longer the time period since immigration, the more 
noticeable these differences:305 
We are thus led to the conclusion that environment has an important 
effect upon the anatomical structure and physiological functions of 
man; and that for this reason differences of type and action between 
primitive and civilized groups of the same race must be expected.306 
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It seems plausible that one of the most potent causes of these 
modifications must be looked for in the progressive domestication of 
man incident to the advance of civilization.307 
Boas did not deny the influence of heredity. Indeed, he devoted an entire 
chapter to discussing its importance for human typology.308 But he drew two 
important conclusions. First, that individual variations within a race were much 
more substantial than the differences between races.309 Many characteristics 
identified as “racial” are nothing more than an expression of the varieties of 
individuals.310 Second, the important differences resulted from a mixture of 
environmental and hereditary forces interacting with one another. 
Boas blamed the then-prevalent idea of Aryan superiority on “the growth 
of modern nationalism, with its exaggerated self-admiration of the Teutonic race.” 
However, “these views are not supported by the results of unbiased research.”311 He 
then devoted an entire chapter to dismantling the argument of earlier post-Darwinian 
anthropologists that the various races were going through “stages” of evolution, with 
Aryans at the most advanced stage. 
In 1916, Boas published a withering attack on eugenics in the popular 
magazine Scientific Monthly. He noted that eugenics simply assumed that 
characteristics were inherited without making any serious attempt to distinguish 
genetic from environmental influences.312 “If an individual possesses a desirable 
quality the development of which is wholly due to environmental causes, and that 
will not be repeated in the descendants, its selection will have no influence upon the 
following generations.”313 As a result, it is “of fundamental importance to know 
what is hereditary and what not.”314 Looking at the various studies of “defective 
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families” such as the Jukes, he concluded that in every case more “favorable home 
surroundings” and “possession of adequate means of support against the abuse of 
alcohol” would certainly have changed the result.315 In fact, “we know that in the 
great mass of a healthy population the social stimulus is infinitely more potent than 
the biological mechanism.”316 
Boas was willing to live with the much less mathematically manageable 
world that environmentalist anthropology envisioned. As noted before, the 
eugenicists’ commitment to mathematics was driven mainly by a quest for scientific 
certainty. But the mathematics of genetic prediction applied only if there were no 
environmentalist “noise” affecting the results. As a result, eugenicists were forced 
to exclude environmental influences as inconsistent with the model. Allow them in, 
and everything becomes indeterminate. Boas additionally objected that even if 
heredity explained everything, the problem of indeterminacy would not go away. In 
particular, he contrasted humans and lower organisms: 
If it is a question of breeding Indian corn or chickens, we know what 
we want. We desire a large yield of good corn, or many eggs of heavy 
weight. But what do we want in man? Is it physical excellence, mental 
ability, creative power, or artistic genius? We must select certain 
ideals that we want to raise. Considering then the fundamental 
differences in ideals of distinct types of civilization, have we a right 
to give our modern ideals the stamp of finality, and suppress what 
does not fit into our life?317 
Boas’s numerous followers from the 1910s through the 1930s and after 
developed culture rather than natural science as the key to understanding human 
personality, temperament, and intelligence. For progressive social scientists, it 
would quickly become the dominant framework for understanding the human 
race.318 Culturalists believed that habits, customs, beliefs, innovation, and even some 
physical characteristics migrated through a society through environmental 
influences, although inheritance remained relevant.319 Further, there was no 
hierarchy. Each culture or cultural practice should be evaluated only by how well it 
served its own members. Already in 1909, Progressive pragmatist John Dewey could 
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declare that “there is no inferior race, and the members of a race so-called should 
each have the same opportunities of social environment and personality as those of 
the more favored race.”320 The comment is interesting. By speaking of a race “so-
called,” Dewey indicated that he had already come around to what would a central 
tenant of progressive anthropology and cultural relativismnamely, that race is 
nothing more than a mental construct. 
B. Behaviorism 
Coming from a very different place but reaching similar results was 
behaviorism in psychology, and later in sociology and other social sciences. John B. 
Watson, the founder of behaviorist psychology, spent most of his career at Johns 
Hopkins University. He began writing his radically anti-hereditarian views in the 
1910s.321 His magnum opus, Behaviorism, was published in 1925.322 Justice Holmes 
read the book and recognized its importance, summarizing in a letter to Harold Laski 
that Watson was “preoccupied with resolving all our conduct into reflex reactions 
to stimuli.”323 
Watson categorically dismissed eugenics and even heredity as a basis for 
understanding human nature, concluding that “one need not give very much weight 
to any of their present conclusions.”324 He acknowledged that “black parents will 
bear black children,” but “these differences are relatively slight. They are due among 
other things to differences in the amount and kind of pigments in the skin.”325 In an 
article written the same year, he concluded, “there is no such thing as an inheritance 
of capacity, talent, temperament, mental constitution and characteristics.”326 
If eugenics went to the extreme of ignoring environmental influences in 
favor of inheritance, behaviorism tended toward the opposite extreme. Luther L. 
Bernard, one of the founders of modern sociology, concluded in 1924 that “[t]he 
naive partisanship of the biologists for . . . the eugenic program in sociology has 
sometimes been pathetic. It reveals equally an appalling ignorance of the facts of 
sociology and social psychology.”327 In 1930, the first edition of the influential and 
heavily behaviorist Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences proclaimed, “At birth 
human infants, regardless of their heredity, are as equal as Fords. . . . Each ready to 
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respond to its appropriate stimulus.”328 The metaphor of new cars rolling off an 
assembly line was powerful. For all practical purposes, there were no differences 
among them. 
Around 1920, sociology—also a very young discipline—began to embrace 
cultural relativism and environmentalism, rejecting the more racist views held by 
elders such as Edward A. Ross.329 For example, William F. Ogburn, one of the most 
prominent sociologists of his era, wrote his book on Social Change in 1922.330 He 
had nothing good to say about eugenics, repeatedly castigating it for 
overemphasizing biology at the expense of the environment in forming human social 
identities.331 In a 1922 article, he attacked those who would use race as an 
explanation paradigm, arguing mainly that cultural change occurred much more 
rapidly than biological change.332 
Finally, major changes in genetics itself served to undermine eugenics.333 
Most importantly, the Galton models were shown to be far too simple, and the 
complexities served to make selective breeding of humans completely impractical. 
Thomas Hunt Morgan, who later received the Nobel Prize for his work on 
chromosomes and heredity, argued in 1924 that social and economic inheritance 
were at least as important as biological inheritance in explaining mankind.334 
Writing in a popular journal on the relative influences of inheritance and 
environment he concluded: 
The geneticist alone cannot hope to solve such a complex problem. 
The psychologist and the physiologist and the pathologist are needed, 
especially in the diagnosis of those characters that belong properly in 
their special fields. The failure of critical diagnosis accounts in large 
part for the disrepute into which some of the work on human mental 
traits has fallen.335 
The nature/nurture controversy began in the 1910s and ran its course 
through the 1920s and 1930s. By the mid-1920s, eugenics had begun to lose its hold 
on the mainstream American academy. The disputes that dominated the 
nature/nurture debate included genetics and eugenics, mental testing, and the role of 
                                                                                                                
 328. Horace M. Kallen, Behaviorism, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
498, 498 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1930). 
 329. For an account, see CRAVENS, supra note 141, at 148–51. 
 330. WILLIAM F. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO CULTURE AND 
ORIGINAL NATURE (1922). 
 331. Id. at 39, 338–39. 
 332. William F. Ogburn, The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social 
Phenomena, 16 PUB. AM. SOC. SOC’Y 70, 72 (1922). 
 333. See CRAVENS, supra note 141, 157–77. 
 334. Thomas Hunt Morgan, Human Inheritance, 58 AM. NATURALIST 385, 406–09 
(1924). 
 335. Id. at 409. 
 
1000 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:947 
instinct in human development.336 In every area, the environmentalists achieved the 
upper hand in the mainstream scientific community. 
Further, as the science of race and mental defect progressed away from 
Gilded Age genetic determinism, it was entirely progressives who led the legal way 
out. In fact, they did so very quickly after more environmentalist, nurture-based 
theories came to dominate the social sciences. The culmination was a dramatic 
turnaround in Supreme Court decision making on race, particularly in the 1944 
“white primary” case and Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948. In the first of these, Smith v. 
Allwight, the Supreme Court overruled a ten-year-old decision,337 voting 81 that an 
election primary for the Democratic Party in Texas that excluded Afro-Americans 
involved sufficient state action to warrant Equal Protection condemnation.338 Justice 
Owen Roberts, the only dissenter, was the last surviving Hoover appointee. All the 
other eight Justices were appointed by Roosevelt. 
Justice Roberts retired from the Court in 1945, and President Truman 
replaced him with Justice Harold Burton, a progressive Republican who had built 
his reputation as the reformist mayor of Cleveland. Four years later, the Supreme 
Court again reversed itself and unanimously held in Shelley v. Kraemer that the 
enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants invoked state action and 
violated the Equal Protection clause.339 The Shelley Court was composed of eight 
Roosevelt appointees and one Truman appointee. From that point on, Democratic 
appointees led the way to Brown v. Board of Education. The most noteworthy 
Republican was Earl Warren—state Attorney General, Governor, and self-
proclaimed progressive before he was appointed to the Court.340 He was appointed 
by Republican President Eisenhower and led the most liberal Supreme Court in 
American history. 
The social science expressed in Brandeis Briefs of race cases tracks similar 
changes. The first two social science briefs filed in race discrimination cases 
defended scientific racism and were presented in the Berea College case in 1908, 
and Buchanan v. Warley in 1917.341 In the 1920s the NAACP turned that shield into 
a sword, however, using Brandeis Briefs to attack race discrimination in areas 
outside of housing.342 In the 1940s, Thurgood Marshall adopted this strategy for 
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desegregation cases, either through the NAACP directly or else through amicus 
briefs written by sympathetic third parties.343 The brief he filed in McGhee v. 
Sipes,344 a companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer, provided evidence about the 
dangers of urban segregation, racial exclusion, and the deteriorating quality of Afro-
American housing. The NAACP’s success in Shelley prompted it to rely on social 
science data much more strongly in Brown v. Board of Education.345 Shelley was 
also the first time that the U.S. government filed an amicus brief in a civil rights 
case. Tom Clark, Attorney General under President Truman, filed the brief urging 
the court to prohibit the enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants.346 
The social science briefs filed in the 1940s and 1950s race cases fall into 
two broad groups. The larger group simply looked at the impact of certain practices. 
For example, the amicus brief of the United States in Shelley contained data about 
the deteriorating condition of urban housing for racial minorities, relating it to the 
heavy presence of racially restrictive covenants that excluded Afro-Americans and 
sometimes Asians from better neighborhoods.347 A smaller group of briefs addressed 
the problem of race and segregation more theoretically, relying heavily on scientific 
work done after the 1920s. One example of the latter was the amicus brief filed by 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (“CIO”) in the Shelley case. It showed just 
how far cultural relativism had come in social science.348 One subtitle in the CIO 
brief described Race as a “vague and abstract concept,” asserting that 
[t]he range of physical variability in mankind has given rise to 
repeated attempts to classify peoples into groups with similar 
inherited characteristics. Yet these characteristics are not 
fundamentally distinct and are overshadowed by the essential 
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uniformities of man morphologically. An individual’s “race” cannot 
be determined with absolute certainty by his appearance. The 
variations in the physical appearance among “races” are not sharp and 
distinct but are a series of gradations.349 
It continued: 
This difficulty in definition is evident in the different racial 
classifications that have been made. Classifications have varied in 
accordance with the series of traits selected as race criteria, with the 
significance assigned to small differences by the observer, and with 
other fluctuations in observation. One anthropologist has pointed out 
that races are “creations of the investigator, and creations with regard 
to which all the creators are by no means in agreement.”350 
The brief then quoted a resolution of the American Anthropological 
Association from the late 1930s that “[a]nthropology provides no scientific basis for 
discrimination against any people on the ground of racial inferiority, religious 
affiliation, or linguistic heritage.”351 
The CIO is a labor organization that was intervening on behalf of plantiffs 
in a housing discrimination case. Its position in Shelley deserves mention. 
Historically, many American labor unions had excluded Afro-Americans as well as 
some other racial minorities. Many of these unions formed into the American 
Federation of Labor (“AFL”), dominated by skilled trades and crafts. By contrast, 
the CIO was composed largely of unions representing unskilled or semi-skilled 
labor. For much of the 1930s and 1940s the two groups took different positions on 
racial exclusion and immigration.352 While the AFL was exclusionary, the CIO 
became more acceptant of Afro-Americans and also refused to support aggressive 
campaigns to restrict immigration.353 The two groups split over these issues in 1935, 
finally reuniting in 1955 after the AFL formally abandoned its policies of racial 
exclusion.354 
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CONCLUSION 
The American Progressives produced an outpouring of writing in 
economics and the social sciences, including law. This makes it easy for someone 
to pick and choose through the Progressive record and make a case for practically 
any proposition. 
This fact places a premium on perspective and balance. Yes, many 
Progressives were racists, but how much did they inherit from their predecessors 
and what exactly did they contribute themselves? And what about contemporary 
non-Progressives, of which there were many? Progressives were no more racist than 
their non-Progressive contemporaries, and the dissenters from genetic natural 
science models were mainly Progressives. Speaking more generally, the historicist 
methodologies and perspectives that the early Progressives inherited were highly 
racist. By contrast, the later methodologies and perspectives that Progressives 
developed internally—namely, marginalism in economics and cultural relativism 
and behaviorism in the social sciences—were environmentalist almost to the point 
of rejecting genetic influences except for trivial things such as physical appearance. 
To be sure, the Progressive conception of an active, legislative state 
imposed dangers because it could make mandatory or regulatory what had 
previously been a purely private choice. Nevertheless, no good empirical case can 
be made that racist legislation or legislation promoting sterilization of perceived 
mental defectives were distinctive products of Progressivism. Most of it came from 
a complex mixture of historical sources antedating the Civil War, found support 
among non-Progressives who opposed the active state in other areas, and in some 
cases, was promoted by anti-Progressives over the objections of Progressives. 
The one place that Progressives made a unique and durable contribution to 
American policy about race and mental defect was in its pursuit of a way out—a 
process that remains unfinished to this day. 
